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Variations on a Theme: Corporate Law in
Latin America, Continental Europe, and
the United States
Ángel R. Oquendo*
The regulation of incorporated companies in Latin America
and Continental Europe appears to distance itself from that
in the United States. It differs in how it structures itself and
handles incorporation, incorporators, piercing, governance, discipline, and shareholders. In their regulatory exertions, both regimes rely, certainly, on legislation and adjudication yet do so differently, qualitatively in addition to
quantitatively.
Apparently, civil and common law continue to specialize
respectively though not exclusively in statutes and binding
precedents. Still, they ever more frequently intrude into
each other’s apparent specialty, while leaving their own
imprint on it. The tendency to converge coexists with that to
diverge.
This general difference, in tandem with the correlative concurrence, has evolved immemorially, growing in nuances
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and exceptions. Absent unexpected cataclysms, it should
persist down this path into the future. So will its more specific counterparts, highlighted throughout the following
discussion. They equally insinuate a somewhat tentative,
simplistic, distortive picture of contrasts and similarities.
So depicted, the Latin American and Continental Europe
scheme seems to foment jurisdictional diversity, concentrate on compliance, enthrone an ever-present state, evoke
the concept of the collective good, and dedicate itself to
stakeholders. On the other hand, the U.S. model appears to
compel convergence among competing jurisdictions, focus
on flexibility or user-friendliness, kowtow to an allpowerful corporation (or directorate), wave the flag of individualism or efficiency, and consecrate itself to stockholders. Expectedly, this seeming opposition on specifics
will likewise endure and modulate alongside any collateral
overlap.
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PROLOGUE
Corporate law seems to operate differently in Latin America
and Continental Europe compared to the United States. It appears
to possess one set of institutions and procedures on one side of the
divide and another one on the other. Surely, these appearances may
ultimately amount to nothing but deception. They may deceptively
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rest on an overplay of the dissimilarities between and an underplay
of those within the juxtaposed realms. Nevertheless, this work will
attempt to show the apparent contrast between the two as real and
as partly based on their contrasting traditional heritages.
In all, the underlying traditions seem to diverge most conspicuously in their approach to legislation and adjudication. Certainly,
they appear not to differ as they (supposedly) did over a century
ago. The civil- and common-law systems do not seem anymore to
derive all their legal precepts from, respectively, statutory and case
law. Notwithstanding, they do appear to treat these two sources
somewhat dissimilarly.
In Latin American and Continental European jurisdictions, the
statute seems to play a prominent though not solitary role as an allencompassing norm. It ordinarily contains jam-packed sections
that seemingly suggest the different parts of a complex rule and
that commentators or adjudicators might break down into subsections for purposes of interpretation. The whole arrangement appears to aspire to arrive in advance at specific solutions for concrete cases.
In the United States, an enactment may govern at the forefront
yet in a fairly fragmented fashion. It seems to consist of various
disconnected components that neither mesh fully nor cover the
entire field. They appear to be waiting for the judiciary to step in as
an interpreter who might contribute some coherence.
Furthermore, reasoned judgments generally seem not to set
binding precedents, particularly for the supreme adjudicative organ, within the so-called Romano-Germanic universe. Nonetheless, they come across as carrying more than persuasive weight,
inching toward their counterparts from the Anglo-American ambit.
Their persuasiveness appears to grow in the slightly technical area
presently at stake. Of course, their compulsion apparently attaches
to the final resolution rather than the opinion as an entirety and
does not imply a shift toward stare decisis.
The present discussion will traverse several subtopics. It will
submit that they seem to illustrate the mentioned divergences, albeit imperfectly. Concurrently, other differences will rise to the fore.
For instance, the U.S. corporative scene features a family of
federally compartmentalized and substantively overlapping
schemes. It pushes them to compete against each other either to
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favor the incorporator as much as possible or, depending on the
analytical perspective, to enable her to run her corporation efficiently to the utmost. The Delawarean alternative appears to have
triumphed in the competition.1
The nations in Latin America and Continental Europe can
hardly foster a comparable contest. They traditionally proffer only
one regime and do not invite businesses headquartered extraterritorially to incorporate nationally. Still, the overall model could cultivate diversity as opposed to convergence. Simultaneously, it
should continue to permit concerns to remain competitive internationally.
On a separate front, the Latin American or Continental European paradigm seems to involve the state more, whether directly
through judges or comptrollers or indirectly through a lawyerly
notary who assures compliance with the law. It also appears to allow greater representation of stakeholders, such as creditors or
workers, through the internal-control bodies within the enterprise.
The analysis will alternatively focus on Argentina and Germany, with occasional references to France and other countries, and
mostly though not exclusively on Delaware. It will paint a general
picture alongside a detailed juxtaposition of the Argentine, German, and Delawarean configuration of companies. Hopefully, the
pictorial details will not cloud but instead illuminate the landscape
behind.
STRUCTURE
Throughout Latin America and Continental Europe, individuals
may set up a business and render themselves but restrictedly responsible.2 In other words, they may invest in an enterprise and
1
See SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1236 (N.D.
Okla. 2017) (“Delaware is the prevailing corporate domicile of choice.”) (quoting E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2005)).
2
See, e.g., Ley [L.] 19550 art. 163 (Arg.) (1984) (“El capital [en la sociedad anónima] se representa por acciones y los socios limitan su responsabilidad
a la integración de las acciones suscriptas.”); CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [CD. COM.]
art. 122(3) (Cuba) (“[En la compañía mercantil] anónima . . . forman[] el fondo
común los asociados por parte o porciones ciertas, figuradas por acciones o de
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risk solely the capital that they contribute. Their personal assets
usually remain immune from claims or judgments against the undertaking.
To achieve such investment and immunity, an investor must
launch either an “anonymous” or a “limitedly liable” “society.”3
The former formula prevails in romance-language cultures to denominate what U.S. lawyers call “corporations.”4 The latter, threeterm formulation refers to what state lawmakers in the United
States designate “limited liability companies,”5 maybe under Continental European influence.

otra manera indubitada, [y] encargan su manejo a mandatarios o administradores
amovibles que representen a la Compañía bajo una denominación apropiada al
objeto o empresa a que se destine sus fondos.”); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock
Law] § 1(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit
eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit. Für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft haftet
den Gläubigern nur das Gesellschaftsvermögen.”); AktG § 1 (Austria) (1965)
(“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit,
deren Gesellschafter mit Einlagen auf das in Aktien zerlegte Grund-kapital
beteiligt sind, ohne persönlich für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft zu
haften”).
3
L. 19550 ch. II, § IV (“DE LA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA”) & § V (“DE LA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”) (Arg.) (1984).
4
See CODE DE COMMERCE [CD. COM.] art. L225-1 (Fr.) (Modified by LOI
2016-563 art. 2 (2016)) (“La société anonyme est la société dont le capital est
divisé en actions et qui est constituée entre des associés qui ne supportent les
pertes qu’à concurrence de leurs apports.”); REAL DECRETO LEGISLATIVO
1/2010 art. 1(1) (Spain) (2010) (“Son sociedades de capital la sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, la sociedad anónima y la sociedad comanditaria por acciones.”); CÓDIGO DAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIAIS [CD. SCDS, COMS.], DecretoLei 262/86 art. 271 (Port.) (1986) (“Na sociedade anónima o capital é dividido
em acções e cada sócio limita a sua responsabilidade ao valor das acções que
subscreveu.”). Cf. AktG § 1 (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine
Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit.”); AktG § 1 (Austria) (1965)
(“Die Aktiengesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit
. . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 [Del. Gen. Corp. L.], §§ 1-619 (2018)
(“Delaware General Corporation Law”).
5
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch. 8, §§ 18-101-1208 (2018) (“Limited
Liability Company Act”). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, &
RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 804-05 (8th ed.
2013) (“The first statute authorizing a limited liability company (LLC) was
adopted in Wyoming in 1977 . . . . By 1999 all 50 states had adopted LLC statutes.”).
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Before the development of such second category, the first
seems to have encompassed all U.S. firms of restricted responsibility, regardless of size or style. Frequently, it ended up itself bifurcating into two: one for larger more complex concerns, one for
smaller simpler ones.6 Perhaps prototypically, Delaware devotes
“Subchapter XIV” of its corporate statute to “Close Corporations.”7 It targets establishments avowing themselves as such, featuring fewer than thirty shareholders, constraining share transfers,
and abstaining from public offerings.8
Pursuant to the pertinent provisions, stockholders may manage
the venture themselves, operate it as a partnership, or agree to empower each other to dissolve it.9 Moreover, they may curb directorial discretion.10 In this jurisdiction, the bench has passed on
election agreements,11 in addition to voting trusts.12 In others, it
has debated restrictions on transferring stock,13 as well as on the
board’s leeway,14 and dissolutions upon a deadlock.15
Like many civil-law societies, Argentina prescribes a single
structure for all incorporated enterprises. It does not supply a separate statutory scheme for closed ones.16 Yet its legislation does
treat them differently now and then.
6

See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 725 (“[M]ore than half
enacted statutory provisions designed specifically to authorize certain control
mechanisms for close corporations.”).
7
Del. Gen. Corp. L., Subchapter XIV (“Close Corporations; Special Provisions”), §§ 341-56. See id. § 341 (“This subchapter applies to all close corporations.”).
8
Id. §§ 343(a), 342(a). See also id. §§ 344-46.
9
Id. §§ 351, 354-55.
10
Id. § 350.
11
See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947); E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 62
N.W.2d 288 (Neb. 1954).
12
See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957); Lehrman v.
Cohen. 222 A.2d 800 (Del. 1966).
13
See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1957);
Rafe v. Hindin. 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1968).
14
See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934); Clark v.
Dodge199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936).
15
See, e.g., Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 77 N.W.2d 389 (Wis.
1956).
16
See ANA MARÍA MEIROVICH DE AGUINIS, EMPRESAS E INVERSIONES EN EL
MERCOSUR: SOCIEDADES Y JOINT VENTURES: ESTABLECIMIENTO DE SUCURSAL Y
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Concretely, The Comptroller does not ordinarily oversee such
entities,17 in contradistinction to their bigger brothers, except for
their “constitutive contract” and their amendments to it.18 Still, she
may police them more comprehensively upon a demand by an investor “with ten percent of” their stock or by a “trustee,”19 or when
she justifiably resolves that she must do so “in defense of the public interest.”20 Close corporations (as opposed to open ones) must
not deliver documentation to the National Securities Commission
or announce all their shareholder meetings and preferential purchase-rights in a major newspaper.21 They may not “distribute anticipated or provisional interests or dividends” or unlimitedly

FILIAL: INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS: IMPUESTOS 278 (1992) (“La sociedad anónima no admite subtipos, esto es, no responde a diferentes regímenes legales
según fuere abierta o cerrada, de familia u otras variantes que ofrece el derecho
extranjero.”).
17
L. 19550 art. 299(1) (Arg.) (1984) (“Las asociaciones anónimas . . . quedan sujetas a la fiscalización de la autoridad de contralor . . . en cualquiera de los
siguientes casos: (1) Hagan oferta pública de sus acciones o debentures . . . .”).
18
Id. art. 300 (“La fiscalización por la autoridad de contralor de las sociedades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299, se limitará al contrato constitutivo, sus reformas y variaciones del capital . . . .”).
19
Id. art. 301(1) (“La autoridad de contralor podrá ejercer funciones de
vigilancia en las sociedades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299 . . . : (1)
Cuando lo soliciten accionistas que representen el diez por ciento (10 %) del
capital suscripto o lo requiera cualquier síndico.”).
20
Id. art. 301(2) (“La autoridad de contralor podrá ejercer funciones de
vigilancia en las sociedades anónimas no incluidas en el artículo 299 . . . : (2)
Cuando lo considere necesario, según resolución fundada, en resguardo del interés público.”).
21
See id. art. 62 (“La Comisión Nacional de Valores, otras autoridades de
contralor y las bolsas, podrán exigir a las sociedades incluidas en el artículo 299,
la presentación de un estado de origen y aplicación de fondos por el ejercicio
terminado, y otros documentos de análisis de los estados contables.”); id. art.
237 (“Las asambleas serán convocadas por publicaciones . . . en el diario de
publicaciones legales. Además, para las sociedades a que se refiere el artículo
299, en uno de los diarios de mayor circulación general de la República.”); id.
art. 194 (“La sociedad hará el ofrecimiento [de nuevas acciones de la misma
clase en proporción a las que poseen] a los accionistas mediante avisos por tres
(3) días en el diario de publicaciones legales y además en uno de los diarios de
mayor circulación general en toda la República cuando se tratare de sociedades
comprendidas en el artículo 299.”).
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“augment” their total “capital” without amending their bylaws.22
Lastly, their stockholders need not appoint a minimum of three
directors nor a collegial trustee-panel or a supervisory council.23
Likewise, German nonpublic corporate firms may require of
their councilors only one “yearly session” instead of the usual
two.24 They enjoy a tad wider wiggle-room in scheduling their
shareholder assemblies and normally need not notarize the approved regular resolutions.25 Finally, an “organization” that knows
its investors “by name” may convoke them simply “by registered
mail.”26
Argentine and German authorities may believe that such exemptions or prohibitions suffice. They may have never felt a burning desire for a specialized codification anyway. After all, their
overarching Romano-Germanic realm has offered from time
(seemingly) immemorial the option of simpler and cozier unincorporated companies that afford abridged answerability. So, it ap22

Id. art. 224 (“Está prohibido distribuir intereses o dividendos anticipados
o provisionales o resultantes de balances especiales, excepto en las sociedades
comprendidas en el artículo 299.”) & 188 (“En las sociedades anónimas autorizadas a hacer oferta pública de sus acciones, la asamblea puede aumentar el
capital sin límite alguno ni necesidad de modificar el estatuto.”).
23
Id. art. 255 (“En las sociedades anónimas del artículo 299, salvo en las
previstas en el inciso (7), el directorio se integrará por lo menos con tres directores.”); id. art. 280 (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia . . . .”);
id. art. 284 (“Cuando la sociedad estuviere comprendida en el artículo 299 —
excepto su inciso (2.)— la sindicatura debe ser colegiada en número impar.”).
24
See AktG § 110(3) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat muss zwei Sitzungen
im Kalenderhalbjahr abhalten. In nichtbörsennotierten Gesellschaften kann der
Aufsichtsrat beschließen, dass eine Sitzung im Kalenderhalbjahr abzuhalten
ist.”).
25
Id. § 121 (7) (“Bei Fristen und Terminen, die von der Versammlung
zurückberechnet werden, ist der Tag der Versammlung nicht mitzurechnen
. . . .Bei nichtbörsennotierten Gesellschaften kann die Satzung eine andere
Berechnung der Frist bestimmen.”); id. § 130(1) (“Jeder Beschluß der
Hauptversammlung ist durch eine über die Verhandlung notariell
aufgenommene Niederschrift zu beurkunden . . . .Bei nichtbörsennotierten
Gesellschaften reicht eine vom Vorsitzenden des Aufsichtsrats zu
unterzeichnende Niederschrift aus, soweit keine Beschlüsse gefaßt werden, für
die das Gesetz eine Dreiviertel- oder größere Mehrheit bestimmt.”).
26
Id. § 121 (4) (“Sind die Aktionäre der Gesellschaft namentlich bekannt,
so kann die Hauptversammlung mit eingeschriebenem Brief einberufen werden,
wenn die Satzung nichts anderes bestimmt; der Tag der Absendung gilt als Tag
der Bekanntmachung.”).
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pears to have separately structured compact concerns all along. On
this entire front, formal discrepancies evidently overlie substantive
resemblances, which may themselves demand an explanation too.
In fact, broadly shared needs, whether real or perceived, may
have similarly shaped this field in different zones around the globe.
They may have, in conjunction with bi- or multilateral collaboration or coercion, generated the general convergences to which this
Section has been alluding from the outset. In parallel, material divergences seem to have instantly developed and gradually steadied, perchance because of the underlying cultural differences.
For sure, sometimes superficial similarities reveal deeper dissimilarities. For instance, Argentina, like the United States, constitutes a federal polity. Nevertheless, it has merely one Business Organizations Act.27 Unlike U.S. states, Argentine provinces do not
pass their own enactments in this domain. Accordingly, enterprises
in Argentina must follow the same basic norms independently of
their provincial location.
The other federated nations in the regions under comparison (to
wit, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, and Venezuela)
approach these matters analogously.28 They do not tender a corporative customer a range of regimes from which it may pick. It must
put up with the parameters legislated countrywide.
Europe’s Union, for its part, inhabits a federative universe of
its own. On the one hand, it provides a legal framework within
which companies active in two or more of its constituent countries
and based in one of them may turn into a Societas Europea.29 On
the other hand, its national units such as Italy, France, Poland, or
Spain possess their own arrangements. They appear to boast more
legislative and adjudicative engagement in this terrain than the
mother ship.
27

L. 19550 arts. 163-307 (Arg.) (1984).
See AktG (Austria) (1965); CODE DES SOCIETES (Belg.) (2019); Lei 6404
(Braz.) (1976); AktG (Ger.) (1965); Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, ch.
V (“De la sociedad anónima”), arts. 87-206 (Mex.) (1934); CD. COM. § V (“De
la Compañía Anónima”), arts. 242-244 (Venez.).
29
See Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of Oct. 8, 2001, On the Statute
for a European Company (SE), 2001 O.J. L 294/1 art. 1 (“A company may be
set up within the territory of the Community in the form of a European public
limited-liability company (Societas Europaea or SE)”).
28
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This whole configuration may come across as an invitation for
incorporators to help themselves to any one of the nationally or
continentally proffered paradigms. However, it might not permit
such flexibility along U.S. lines. Apparently, organizations with
their headquarters in one jurisdiction often may not be easily chartered in another one. For example, they must take up “domicile” in
a German “locality,” as well as specify which in their “bylaws,” to
incorporate in Germany.30 Of course, the European Court of Justice has commanded the “registration,” upon request, of commercial concerns from any “member State” in any other one.31 The
command holds even if they “conduct” none of their “business” in
the former and all in the latter.32
Arguably, the two sorts of vertically aligned sovereigns within
U.S. federalism also rule side by side. They do so sub silentio,
though. Once again, one of them—namely, the federation—has
neither enacted its own code of commerce nor authorized entrepreneurs federally to promote prospective or existing corporations.
Nonetheless, it has heavily regulated such entities since the 1930s
through the backdoor of its securities laws and rules.33 Slowly but
surely, this regulation might be relegating that through chartering.
In sum, the nations on one or the other coast of the Rio Grande
or the North Atlantic Ocean purportedly pursue a roughly identical
end in this area. Notwithstanding, those that dwell within the civillaw tradition present promotors with one model, or two in the case
of Europe. In contrast, the United States parades fifty. Indeed, it
seems to have facilitated headquartering, as well as founding,
30

See AktG § 5 (Ger.) (1965) (“Sitz”) (“Sitz der Gesellschaft ist der Ort im
Inland, den die Satzung bestimmt.”).
31
Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999]
E.C.R. I-01459, ¶ 30 (“[T]he refusal of a Member State to register a branch of a
company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which
it has its registered office on the grounds that the branch is intended to enable
the company to carry on all its economic activity in the host State, with the result that the secondary establishment escapes national rules on the provision for
and the paying-up of a minimum capital, is incompatible with Articles 52 and 58
of the Treaty, in so far as it prevents any exercise of the right freely to set up a
secondary establishment . . . .”). See also id. ¶ 38, Operative Part.
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a et seq (2018); Securities Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a et seq (2018).
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businesses anywhere on its territory through its social and economic homogenization from the turn of the twentieth century on.
Under these circumstances, U.S. states appear to have been
competing against each other in a cutthroat market ever since.
They might have driven many a corporation away if they had insisted, in the manner of the German system today, that it reside in
reality within their borders to incorporate. In 1933, Louis D.
Brandeis observed a widespread removal of “safeguards” in an
“eager [quest] for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters.”34 He deplored a “race . . . not of diligence but of laxity.”35
Starting around the 1980s, a number of “scholars” have openly
objected to his observation or his lamentation. They have commended such “competition” as conducive to “efficient changes that
eliminated anachronistic elements of state . . . statutes without
harming investors.”36
At a distance from this debate, the Latin American and European Continents might want at some point to embrace diversity at
an international or a transnational level. Upon each becoming more
homogeneous socially and economically, they might seek to enable
any mobile company to choose among the available alternatives
the one that best suits its particular necessities. In response, it
might base its choice, if legally incited to do so, on an ample array
of principles and values, not just efficiency. Ultimately, the United
States might itself learn from such an effort.
INCORPORATION
The discussed dialectic of convergences and divergences permeates not only the structure but also the particulars of commonand civil-law corporate regulation. Therefore, it lies at the heart of
the setup solemnities. The Argentine, German, and U.S. experiences will continue to guide the discussion.
Throughout Latin American and Continental European territories, the corporation’s foundation seems to transpire typically

34
35
36

Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933).
Id. at 559.
See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 26.
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through a notarized instrument.37 Argentina provides a case in
point.38 So does Germany.39
Contrary to her U.S. counterparts, the Romano-Germanic notary appears to play the role of an impartial attorney, beyond impartially witnessing signatures.40 She may “draft” and “authenticate”
as well as “receive” the documentation within her purview and
must ensure their “conformity with the law.”41 Her engagement

37

See, e.g., AktG § 16(1) (Austria) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”)
(“Die Satzung muß in Form eines Notariatsakts festgestellt werden.”).
38
L. 19550 art. 165 (Arg.) (1984) (“La sociedad se constituye por instrumento público . . . .”). See also id. art. 4 (“El contrato por el cual se constituya o
modifique una sociedad, se otorgará por instrumento público o privado.”).
39
AktG § 23(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”) (“Die Satzung
muß durch notarielle Beurkundung festgestellt werden. Bevollmächtigte
bedürfen einer notariell beglaubigten Vollmacht.”). See also id. § 30(1) (“Die
Gründer haben den ersten Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft und den Abschlußprüfer
für das erste Voll- oder Rumpfgeschäftsjahr zu bestellen. Die Bestellung bedarf
notarieller Beurkundung.”).
40
See generally L. 12.990 art. 1(c) (Arg.) (1947) (“Para ejercer el notariado
se requiere: . . . c) Tener título de escribano expedido por universidad nacional,
provincial o privada, debidamente habilitado en el caso de estos dos últimos, con
tal que su otorgamiento requiera estudios completos de la enseñanza media previos a los de carácter universitario, los que deberán abarcar la totalidad de las
materias y disciplinas análogas a las que se cursen para la carrera de abogacía
. . . .”); BUNDESNOTARORDNUNG (BNotO) § 5 (Ger.) (1937) (“Zum Notar darf
nur bestellt werden, wer die Befähigung zum Richteramt nach dem Deutschen
Richtergesetz erlangt hat.”); id. § 14(1) (“Der Notar . . . ist nicht Vertreter einer
Partei, sondern unabhängiger und unparteiischer Betreuer der Beteiligten.”). Cf.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, ch. 43 (“Notaries Public”), § 4323 (2018) (“A notarial
act may be performed within this State by the following persons: (1) A notary
public of this State; (2) A judge, clerk or deputy clerk of any court of this State;
(3) A person licensed to practice law in this State; (4) A person authorized by
the law of this State to administer oaths; and (5) Any other person authorized to
perform the specific act by the law of this State.” ).
41
L. 12.990 art. 10 (Arg.) (1947) (“El escribano de registro es el funcionario público instituido para recibir y redactar y dar autenticidad, conforme a las
leyes y en los casos que ellas autorizan, los actos y contratos que le fueran encomendados. Sólo a él compete el ejercicio del notariado.”). Cf. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, ch. 43 (“Notaries Public”), § 4322(b) (2018) (“In taking a verification upon oath or affirmation, the notarial officer must determine, either from
personal knowledge of identity or from satisfactory evidence of identity, that the
person appearing before the officer and making the verification is the person
whose true signature is on the statement verified.”).
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evidently enhances the extent of official control over the private
transactions before her.
The United States seems to stage a simpler process without any
notarization. For instance, the latter concept features nowhere in
the 119 pages of the applicable Delawarean code.42 Incorporators
may simply sign “the certificate of incorporation, . . . under penalties of perjury,” and file it.43 The Secretary of State, who collects,
stores, but probably seldom peruses the documents, may “refuse[]
[them] [for] error, omission or [any] other imperfection.”44 Not
surprisingly, she faces “no liability” for “inaccurately, defectively,
or erroneously”45 executed filings.
Within governing regimes in Latin America and Europe, the
mandatory notarial participation on substance seemingly signals
the presence of the state. It appears to aim at assuring that citizens
abide by the governmental mandate embodied in the enactments.
In the U.S. model, individuals seem to embark upon a straightforward albeit somewhat bureaucratic operation pretty much on their
own.
These dual diametrically dissimilar standpoints confront each
other. In the first, the authorities apparently define each civic right
before them and oversee its enforcement. In the second, they outwardly recognize it as stemming from an extra- or a pre-political
source, whether liberty or efficiency, and as calling for vindication
through self-help or -service.
The civil law seems to set itself apart on the rest of the formation formalities too. The Argentine Congress has distinguished
two main routes to incorporate a business.46 It has demanded a
choice between them.47

42

See Del. Gen. Corp. L., §§ 1-619.
Id. § 101(a) (“Any person, . . . may incorporate . . . a corporation . . . by
filing . . . a certificate of incorporation which shall be executed, acknowledged
and filed . . . .”); 103 (For execution, “[t]he certificate of incorporation . . . shall
be signed by the incorporator.); id. (The acknowledgement “requirement is satisfied by [t]he signature.”).
44
Id. § 103 (g).
45
Id.
46
L. 19550 art. 165 (Arg.) (1984) (“La sociedad se constituye por instrumento público y por acto único o por suscripción pública.”).
47
Id.
43
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Most cleanly, the creation of the company and the acquisition
of all the stock may occur at once though a “single act.”48 The
“founders,” “the signatories [before a notary] of the constitutive
contract,”49 must specify in it the terms, the classes and specific
entitlements of shares, and the mechanics for the election of the
directorial board and trustee panel.50 They must include the legislatively indicated information—such as the identity of the shareholders, the organizational “denomination” and “domicile,” the “object,” the amount of capital, the “duration” of the venture, and diverse details on management, monitoring, and meetings—in the
same “instrument,”51 the equivalent of the U.S. “charter,” “certificate,” or “articles of incorporation.”52
The incorporators may or may not attach the bylaws,53 known
locally in Spanish as “the statute.”54 To consummate the “constitution,”55 they must docket the relevant documentation with the

48

Id. art. 166 (“[S]e constituye por acto único . . . .”).
Id. (“Todos los firmantes del contrato constitutivo se consideran fundadores.”) ; id. art. 165 (“La sociedad se constituye por instrumento público y por
acto único . . . .”).
50
Id. arts. 166(1) (“Si se constituye por acto único, el instrumento de constitución contendrá . . . Respecto del capital social: la naturaleza, clases, modalidades de emisión y demás características de las acciones . . . .”), 166(3) (“Si se
constituye por acto único, el instrumento de constitución contendrá . . . La elección de los integrantes de los órganos de administración y de fiscalización, fijándose el término de duración en los cargos.”).
51
Id. art. 11 (“El instrumento de constitución debe contener . . . : 1) El
nombre, edad, estado civil, nacionalidad, profesión, domicilio y número de documento de identidad de los socios. 2) La razón social o la denominación, y el
domicilio de la sociedad . . . .3) La designación de su objeto, que debe ser preciso y determinado; 4) El capital social, que deberá ser expresado en moneda argentina, y la mención del aporte de cada socio . . . .5) El plazo de duración, que
debe ser determinado; 6) La organización de la administración, de su fiscalización y de las reuniones de socios . . . .”).
52
CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 234 n.34.
53
AGUINIS, supra note 16, at 280 (“Los estatutos de la sociedad anónima
pueden o no integrar formalmente el acto fundacional . . . .”).
54
L. 19550 art. 68 (Arg.) (1984) (“el estatuto”).
55
Id. art. 167 (Se “[c]onforma . . . la constitución” después de la inscripción
por el “Juez de Registro.”).
49
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Comptroller.56 The latter verifies it and forwards it to the “Registry
Judge.”57
Secondly, Argentina permits promoters to launch their concern
by public subscription over a relatively prolonged period. To embark upon this journey, they must draft a signed and notarized
“foundational program” and submit it to the aforementioned officeholders.58 It should basically identify the promoting businesspersons, spell out the “basis of the bylaws,” inventory the sorts of
stock, and reveal “the possible benefits and advantages that [the
adventurers] have reserved for themselves.”59 The legislation delineates the minimum requirements for the subscribers agreement,60 as well as the duties of the bank placing the shares.61
The “deadline” for subscribing may not “exceed three
months.”62 If the effort fails due to insufficient committing investors, the banking institution must “immediately return” the deposited funds.63 In case of success, the new corporation springs into
existence with those who assumed a commitment as its stockholders. In the event of oversubscription, it must either “prorate,” or

56

Id. art. 167 (“El contrato constitutivo será presentado a la autoridad de
contralor para verificar el cumplimiento de los requisitos legales y fiscales.”).
57
Id. art. 167 (“Conformada la constitución, el expediente pasará al Juez de
Registro, quien dispondrá la inscripción si la juzgara procedente.”).
58
Id. art. 168 (“En la constitución por suscripción pública los promotores
redactarán un programa de fundación por instrumento público o privado, que se
someterá a la aprobación de la autoridad de contralor . . . .Aprobado el programa, deberá presentarse para su inscripción en el Registro Público de Comercio
. . . .”); id. art. 170(5) (“Las firmas de los otorgantes deben ser autenticadas por
escribano público u otro funcionario competente.”).
59
Id. art. 170 (“El programa de fundación debe contener: 1) Nombre, edad,
estado civil, nacionalidad, profesión, número de documento de identidad y domicilio de los promotores; 2) Bases del estatuto; 3) Naturaleza de las acciones:
monto de las emisiones programadas, condiciones del contrato de suscripción y
anticipos de pago a que obligan; . . . 5) Ventajas o beneficios eventuales que los
promotores proyecten reservarse.”).
60
Id. art. 172.
61
Id. arts. 170(4), 178.
62
Id. art. 171 (“El plazo de suscripción, no excederá de tres (3) meses
. . . .”).
63
Id. art. 173. (“No cubierta la suscripción en el término establecido, los
contratos se resolverán de pleno derecho y el banco restituirá de inmediato a
cada interesado, el total entregado, sin descuento alguno.”).
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“increase” its capital, to accept all offers when it organizationally
meets.64
Upon subscription, a comptrollership representative must chair
the formative assembly with the “intervening bank” in attendance.65 Shareholders collectively holding more than fifty percent of
the stock must show up.66 They must decide by majority, with the
support of at least a third of total capital.67 Though the bylaws may
allow shares with up to fivefold the voting weight of ordinary
stock,68 each share entitles its holder to one ballot during this opening gathering.69 Then, the investors officially “constitute the organization,” approve the promotion, as well as the “bylaws,” consider
the value of in-kind payments, install the “directors” and “trustees,” or supervisory council, and so forth.70
Germany, in turn, boasts its own version of the first procedural
path. The charter must supply information on the “founders,”
“stock,” and “paid capital.” The bylaws must inform about the corporation’s “name,” “domicile,” “object,” and “managing board.”71
64
Id. art. 174 (“Cuando las suscripciones excedan . . . el monto previsto, la
asamblea constitutiva decidirá su reducción a prorrata o aumentará el capital
hasta el monto de las suscripciones.”).
65
Id. art. 176 (“La asamblea constitutiva debe celebrarse con presencia del
banco interviniente y será presidida por un funcionario de la autoridad de contralor . . . .”).
66
Id. art. 176 (“La asamblea constitutiva . . .quedará constituida con la mitad más una de las acciones suscriptas.”).
67
Id. art. 177 (“Las decisiones se adoptarán por la mayoría de los suscriptores presentes que representen no menos de la tercera parte del capital suscripto
con derecho a voto . . . .”).
68
Id. art. 216 (“Cada acción ordinaria da derecho a un voto. El estatuto
puede crear clases que reconozcan hasta cinco votos por acción ordinaria.”).
69
Id. art. 177 (“Cada suscriptor tiene derecho a tantos votos como acciones
haya suscripto . . . .”).
70
Id. art. 179 (“La asamblea resolverá . . . sobre los siguientes temas que
deben formar parte del orden del día: 1) Gestión de los promotores 2) Estatuto
social 3) Valuación provisional de los aportes no dinerarios, en caso de existir . . . .4) Designación de directores y síndicos o consejo de vigilancia en su
caso; 5) Determinación del plazo de integración del saldo de los aportes en dinero; 6) Cualquier otro asunto que el banco considerare de interés incluir en el
orden del día . . . .”).
71
AktG § 23(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Feststellung der Satzung”) (“In der
Urkunde sind anzugeben 1. die Gründer; 2. bei Nennbetragsaktien der
Nennbetrag, bei Stückaktien die Zahl, der Ausgabebetrag . . . ; 3. der eingezahlte
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They must break down the various shares authorized yet may not
accord any of them more than one vote.72
After chartering the venture, the incorporators “establish” it
through their “assumption of all shares.”73 They must additionally
craft a “foundational report.”74 The document must account for
“the appropriateness of the contributions in kind and of those in
exchange for assets.”75 It must disclose any advantaging of managers or councilors.76
Coincidentally, these corporate officials “must review the execution of the foundation.”77 Moreover, they must, in concomitance
with whoever founded the company, judicially “report” it “for inscription in the commercial register.”78 The registering “Court”
must corroborate that “the organization’s establishment and registration unfolded appropriately.”79

Betrag des Grundkapitals.”). See also id. § 23(3) (“Die Satzung muß bestimmen
1. die Firma und den Sitz der Gesellschaft; 2. den Gegenstand des
Unternehmens; . . . 3. die Höhe des Grundkapitals; 4. die Zerlegung des
Grundkapitals entweder in Nennbetragsaktien oder in Stückaktien . . . ; 6. die
Zahl der Mitglieder des Vorstands . . . .”).
72
Id. § 12(2) (“Mehrstimmrechte sind unzulässig.”).
73
Id. § 29 (“Mit der Übernahme aller Aktien durch die Gründer ist die
Gesellschaft errichtet.”).
74
Id. § 32(1) (“Die Gründer haben einen schriftlichen Bericht über den
Hergang der Gründung zu erstatten (Gründungsbericht).”).
75
Id. § 32(2) (“Im Gründungsbericht sind die wesentlichen Umstände
darzulegen, von denen die Angemessenheit der Leistungen für Sacheinlagen
oder Sachübernahmen abhängt.”).
76
Id. § 32(3) (“Im Gründungsbericht ist ferner anzugeben, ob und in
welchem Umfang bei der Gründung für Rechnung eines Mitglieds des
Vorstands oder des Aufsichtsrats Aktien übernommen worden sind und ob und
in welcher Weise ein Mitglied des Vorstands oder des Aufsichtsrats sich einen
besonderen Vorteil oder für die Gründung oder ihre Vorbereitung eine
Entschädigung oder Belohnung ausbedungen hat.”).
77
Id. § 33(1) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats haben
den Hergang der Gründung zu prüfen.”).
78
Id. § 36(1) (“Die Gesellschaft ist bei dem Gericht von allen Gründern und
Mitgliedern des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats zur Eintragung in das
Handelsregister anzumelden.”).
79
Id. § 38(1) (“Das Gericht hat zu prüfen, ob die Gesellschaft
ordnungsgemäß errichtet und angemeldet ist.”).
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German promoters “must appoint the supervisory council . . .
and the annual auditor” for the first year.80 They must do so with
“notarial authentication.”81 The councilors designate “the directorate.”82
Expectedly, Delaware streamlines the whole routine: “Any
[natural or juridical] person, . . . singly or jointly with others, . . .
may incorporate or organize a corporation . . . by filing” the charter.83 This instrument must mainly contain the enterprise’s “name,”
its “address,” the “nature of [its] business or purposes,” the types
and numbers of its “stock,” and the contact information of its
founders.84
“After the filing of the certificate . . . , a majority of the incorporators” of the board must “call” an organizational “meeting.”85 It
must notify everybody who may attend, except whoever has
waived notification. The attendees must “adopt[] bylaws, elect[]
directors” and “officers” to any vacancies, “do[] any . . . further
acts to perfect the organization,” “and transact[]” any other matter
that “may [crop]” up.86 Likewise, “most states” require promoters
to meet to these ends.87
German and the U.S. lawmakers appear not to have legislated
the second procedure. Their French colleagues have, though.88
They may have influenced the Argentine approach. Of course, a
company in Germany or the United States might want to solicit
and capitalize investments from subscribers. In all probability, it
would do so on its own rather than under the watch of the administration.
80

Id. § 30(1) (“Die Gründer haben den ersten Aufsichtsrat der Gesellschaft
und den Abschlußprüfer für das erste Voll- oder Rumpfgeschäftsjahr zu
bestellen.”).
81
Id. (“Die Bestellung bedarf notarieller Beurkundung.”).
82
Id. § 30(4) (“Der Aufsichtsrat bestellt den ersten Vorstand.”).
83
See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 101(a).
84
Id. § 102(a)(3).
85
See, e.g., id. § 108(a).
86
Id.
87
CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 237.
88
See CD. COM. Legislative Part, bk. II, tit. II, ch. V, § 1, Subsection 1 (“De
la constitution avec offre au public”), arts. L225-2-L225-11-1 (Fr.) (“Il peut être
stipulé par les statuts de toute société anonyme que celle-ci est régie par les dispositions de la présente sous-section.”).
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To wrap up: The Latin American and Continental European
paradigm, as opposed to its U.S. counterpart, engages functionaries, whether from the Comptroller’s Office or the judiciary, in the
foundational exertions, as well as notarization attorneys. In addition, it rests on a detailed codification instead of an open-ended
one waiting for judicial interpretation. By and large, the state intervenes itself, in flesh and soul, not through intermediaries.
INCORPORATORS
In Argentina, incorporators must attach the label “sociedad
anónima” (literally “anonymous society”) or “S.A.” to their selected name.89 In Germany, they must write in the expression
“‘Aktiengesellschaft [stock organization]’ or any generally understandable abbreviation.”90 Somewhat similarly, their U.S. counterparts must typically append a word such as “incorporated” at the
end when naming the enterprise.91
Omitting the reference formerly exposed Argentine shareholders to collective liability without limits.92 In all likelihood, the notarial control would have caught and prevented any such mishap in
the first place. With the passage of the 2016 Civil Code, the legislature amended the relevant specialized Article and withdrew the
mention of a sanction for the omission.93 It thus retreated from its
earlier formalistic and draconian stance, tacitly encouraging a caseby-case approach.

89

L. 19550 art. 164 (Arg.) (1984) (“La denominación social . . . debe contener la expresión ‘sociedad anónima’, su abreviatura o la sigla S.A.”).
90
AktG § 4 (Ger.) (1965) (“Firma”) (“Die Firma der Aktiengesellschaft
muß . . . die Bezeichnung ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ oder eine allgemein verständliche
Abkürzung dieser Bezeichnung enthalten.”).
91
See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 102(1) (“The name of the corporation . . .
shall contain one of the words ‘association,’ ‘company,’ ‘corporation,’ ‘club,’
‘foundation,’ ‘fund,’ ‘incorporated,’ ‘institute,’ ‘society,’ ‘union,’ ‘syndicate,’ or
‘limited,’ or one of the abbreviations . . . .”).
92
L. 19550 art. 164 (Arg.) (1984) (as originally enacted) (“La omisión de
esta mención hará responsables ilimitada y solidariamente a los representantes
de la sociedad juntamente con ésta, por los actos que celebren en esas condiciones.”).
93
See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), Annex II, § 2.22.
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Prior to the completion of a single-act foundation in Argentina,
the directorial officials may only obligate their company on undertakings either needed for “its constitution” or linked to the “organizational object” and “expressly” contemplated in the “constitutive
act.”94 Nevertheless, they must sustain joint and unlimited responsibility, along with the “founders” and the prospective business, for
such exertions.95 So must all these parties, together with anyone
else implicated, for any other actions in connection with the incorporation effort.96
Upon registering the constituting “contract,” the concern responds all by itself for “necessary” and contractually consented-to
promotional dealings.97 Moreover, the directorate may resolve that
the corporation embrace any other engagements “up to three
months after registration.”98 Any such embracement does not,
however, exempt the engagers, founders, or “directors” from their
own answerability.99
Correlatively, the applicable Argentine statute pronounces
“promotors jointly and unlimitedly liable” for any transaction prior

94

L. 19550 art. 183 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los directores solo tienen facultades
para obligar a la sociedad respecto de los actos necesarios para su constitución y
los relativos al objeto social cuya ejecución durante el período fundacional haya
sido expresamente autorizada en el acto constitutivo.”).
95
Id. art. 183 (“Los directores, los fundadores y la sociedad en formación
son solidaria e ilimitadamente responsables por estos actos mientras la sociedad
no esté inscripta.”).
96
Id. art. 183 (“Por los demás actos cumplidos antes de la inscripción serán
responsables ilimitada y solidariamente las personas que los hubieran realizado
y los directores y fundadores que los hubieren consentido.”).
97
Id. art. 184 (“Inscripto el contrato constitutivo, los actos necesarios para
la constitución y los realizados en virtud de expresa facultad conferida en el acto
constitutivo, se tendrán como originariamente cumplidos por la sociedad. Los
promotores, fundadores y directores quedan liberados frente a terceros de las
obligaciones emergentes de estos actos.”).
98
Id. art. 184 (“El directorio podrá resolver, dentro de los tres (3) meses de
realizada la inscripción, la asunción por la sociedad [de] las obligaciones resultantes de los demás actos cumplidos antes de la inscripción, dando cuenta a la
asamblea ordinaria.”).
99
Id. art. 184 (“La asunción de estas obligaciones por la sociedad, no libera
de responsabilidad a quienes las contrajeron, ni a los directores y fundadores que
los consintieron.”).
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to a promotion by subscription.100 Thereafter, the company may
“assume any obligation legitimately undertaken” by them and “reimburse them” for any essential expenditure.101 It may repay them
for the rest upon obtaining authorization when the investors first
meet.102
Likewise, “whoever acts on behalf of [a stock issuing German
business] before” it registers renders herself personally accountable.103 Nonetheless, it may accept any ensuing charges and step in
her shoes up to ninety days after its registration.104 All the same,
the bylaws must integrate, for adoption, any “contract on special
advantages, formation outlay, contribution in kind, or asset acquisition.”105
In Delaware, the “the . . . incorporators . . . manage the affairs
of the corporation and may do whatever is necessary and proper to
perfect the organization [until] the election of” the board.106 In
light of this language, they could plausibly recover their expenses
even without corporate consent. Presumably, the incorporated entity may voluntarily agree to pay them back for reasonably related
though unnecessary payments. On the other hand, it could face
legitimate resistance on disbursements enjoying no such reasona100

Id. 182 (“En la constitución sucesiva, los promotores responden ilimitada
y solidariamente por las obligaciones contraídas para la constitución de la sociedad . . . .”).
101
Id. (“Una vez inscripta, la sociedad asumirá las obligaciones contraídas
legítimamente por los promotores y les reembolsará los gastos realizados, si su
gestión ha sido aprobada por la asamblea constitutiva o si los gastos han sido
necesarios para la constitución.”).
102
Id.
103
AktG § 41(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Wer vor der Eintragung der Gesellschaft in
ihrem Namen handelt, haftet persönlich; handeln mehrere, so haften sie als
Gesamtschuldner.”).
104
Id. § 41(2) (“Übernimmt die Gesellschaft eine vor ihrer Eintragung in
ihrem Namen eingegangene Verpflichtung durch Vertrag mit dem Schuldner in
der Weise, daß sie an die Stelle des bisherigen Schuldners tritt, so bedarf es zur
Wirksamkeit der Schuldübernahme der Zustimmung des Gläubigers nicht, wenn
die Schuldübernahme binnen drei Monaten nach der Eintragung der Gesellschaft
vereinbart und dem Gläubiger von der Gesellschaft oder dem Schuldner
mitgeteilt wird.”).
105
Id. § 41(3) (“Verpflichtungen aus nicht in der Satzung festgesetzten
Verträgen über Sondervorteile, Gründungsaufwand, Sacheinlagen oder
Sachübernahmen kann die Gesellschaft nicht übernehmen.”).
106
See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 107.
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ble relationship and therefore coming across as ultra vires, or
against its powers.
If unable to persuade her fellows with arguments, a stockholder
resisting along these lines could sue and “enjoin” the enterprise.107
She could so proceed despite an authorizing agreement.108 The
concern itself could lodge a complaint against the responsible officers or board members “for loss or damage.”109 Ultimately, the
“Attorney General” could request a forced dissolution or an injunction against any transacted yet “unauthorized business.”110
The details differ between and within the traditions on how to
reimburse costs connected to the promotion. U.S. jurisdictions
seem to stand alone in allowing the concern implicitly to adopt
promotional commitments.111 Iowa’s top tribunal has insisted that
“[t]he adoption or ratification . . . need not be shown by express
acts, but it may be established by implication.”112 Coincidentally,
conceptualizing the juridical person as a ratifier under agency theory entails complications in this context. Since the company, the
putative principal, “was not in existence at the time of the promoter’s [(or agent’s)] contract . . . , it could not [have] then authorize[d]” the contractual pledge.113 One should perhaps portray it
instead as an adopter.
Apparently universally, an incorporator who has not adequately
accomplished the process of incorporation may normally not use
107
See, e.g., id. § 124(1) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n
a proceeding by a stockholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing of any
act . . . by or to the corporation.”).
108
See, e.g., id. § 124(1) (“If the unauthorized acts . . . sought to be enjoined
are being, or are to be, performed or made pursuant to any contract to which the
corporation is a party, the court may [equitably] set aside and enjoin the performance of such contract . . . .”).
109
See, e.g., id. § 124(2) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n
a proceeding by the corporation, . . . against an incumbent or former officer or
director of the corporation, for loss or damage . . . .”).
110
See, e.g., id. § 124(3) (“[L]ack of capacity or power may be asserted [i]n
a proceeding by the Attorney General to dissolve the corporation, or to enjoin
the corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.”).
111
See, e.g., Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., 191 N.W. 803, 804 (Iowa
1923) (“[T]he ratification or adoption of a contract by a corporation through its
board of directors may be implied.”).
112
Id.
113
CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 283.
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the corporate form on pain of full accountability. In the United
States (maybe uniquely), she might get off the hook by vesting her
venture with “de jure” or “de facto” status through, respectively,
“substantial” or attempted, good-faith “compliance.”114 In the former scenario, “courts will recognize [the organization] for all purposes.”115 In the latter, they will do as much “except [against] the
state,” which may have the enterprise terminated in a “quo warranto proceeding.”116
Nevertheless, U.S. state legislators have bent over backward to
abolish this doctrinal legacy.117 In the next breath, they have occasionally reclaimed the notion “of corporation by estoppel.”118 Accordingly, the legitimacy of an entity “claiming a charter under
color of law . . . cannot be collaterally attacked by persons who
have dealt with it as” such.119
Such looseness might reflect the flexibility or user-friendliness
supposedly characteristic of the common law. More likely, it might
show the ability and willingness of U.S. judges to adjudicate equitably, whether against the mandate or with the encouragement of
lawmakers. In contrast, Latin America and Europe appear to rely
religiously on the statutory particulars and to keep the bench on a
short leash.

114

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 238.
116
Id. at 239.
117
Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander 525 P.2d 135, 138 (Or.
1974) (“[T]he statute [in force] was intended to abolish the common-law doctrine of de facto corporations.”); Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 287 S.E.2d
577, 578 (Ga. 1981) (“The Business Corporation Code of Georgia has eliminated the doctrine of de facto corporations as applied to defectively organized corporations . . . .”); Thompson & Green Machinery Co. v. Music City Lumber Co.,
683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he Tennessee General Assembly, by
passage of the Tennessee General Corporations Act of 1968, abolished the concept of de facto incorporation . . . .”).
118
Don Swann, 287 S.E.2d at 578 (“However, Code Ann. § 22-5103 has
retained the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.”). But cf. Thompson & Green
Machinery, 683 S.W.2d at 345 (“We are of the opinion that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel met its demise by the enactment of the Tennessee General
Corporations Act of 1968.”).
119
Don Swann, 287 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Business Corporation Code of
Georgia Ann. § 22-5103).
115
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PIERCING
An Argentine adjudicator must sometimes refuse to restrict responsibility even though the incorporators have fully fulfilled the
foundation formalities.120 She must then (in U.S. jargon) “pierce
the corporate veil.”121 Accordingly, investors become entirely liable for their firm’s debts.
The relevant statute renders “shareholders and controllers”
jointly and unlimitedly responsible for running their venture inconsistently with the stated business “purposes,” “the law,” “the public
order” or “good faith,” “or” to the detriment of “third parties.”122
Perhaps it should have hooked up the finishing phrase with the
conjunction ‘and’ instead. After all, the damage to others should
amount to not a separate justification to disregard the corporative
form but an essential element to stake a claim. Otherwise, the
bench could confront countless complaints. In the Connecticut top
tribunal’s phrasing of the “instrumentality rule” in this area, the
plaintiff must prove “[c]ontrol,” a “wrong or fraud,” “and” an “unjust loss.”123
The German code, for its part, does not contemplate these
causes. It leaves them and their treatment to the judicial branch.
The latter has enunciated, expectedly in the context of relatively
cozy limited-liability companies, that “the prospect of personal
accountability surfaces whenever the demarcation between organizational and private wealth blurs through nontransparent
bookkeeping or other means.”124 It has elaborated that in the midst
120

See generally L. 19550 art. 54 (Arg.) (1984).
See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 352 (1996) (“The District
Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment
. . . .”).
122
L. 19550 art. 54 (Arg.) (1984) (“La actuación de la sociedad que encubra
la consecución de fines extrasocietarios, constituya un mero recurso para violar
la ley, el orden público o la buena fe o para frustrar derechos de terceros, se
imputará directamente a los socios o a los controlantes que la hicieron posible,
quienes responderán solidaria e ilimitadamente por los perjuicios causados.”).
123
Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967)
124
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Highest Federal Ordinary Court], Nov. 14,
2005, II ZR 178/03, ¶ 14 (“Nach der Rechtsprechung des Senates kommt eine
persönliche Haftung . . .in Betracht, wenn die Abgrenzung zwischen
Gesellschafts- und Privatvermögen durch eine undurchsichtige Buchführung
oder auf andere Weise verschleiert worden ist . . . .”).
121
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of such blur, “the capital-protection prescriptions, whose observance constitutes an indispensable quid pro quo for the limitation of liability to the organization’s assets, cannot function.”125
Consequently, the judiciary in Germany has sided with aspirant
piercers “on account of misuse of the [concern’s] juridical
form.”126 It has focused primordially on “cases of commingling of
income.”127 The precedents do not seem to extrapolate to a condemnation of any stockholder who fraudulently or illegally misuses the institution.
Already in 1906, the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin did not itself shy away from a generalized formulation,
famous throughout the United States:
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present
state of authority, it is that a corporation will be
looked upon as a legal entity . . . until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the [corporative structure] is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons.128
Hence, the passage opens with a presumption against piercing
and ends up formulating the rebuttal in terms that recall those of
Argentina’s legislation. On the flip side of the coin and as pronounced by New York’s forum of last resort, investors “clearly
125

Id. (“[D]eshalb [können] die Kapitalerhaltungsvorschriften, deren
Einhaltung ein unverzichtbarer Ausgleich für die Haftungsbeschränkung auf das
Gesellschaftsvermögen . . .ist, nicht funktionieren . . . .”).
126
BGH, July 16, 2007, Trihotel, II ZR 3/04, ¶ 27 (“Durchgriffshaftung
wegen Missbrauchs der Rechtsform der GmbH”) (citing BGH, July 24, 2002, II
ZR 300/00).
127
Id. (“Rechtsfolge wäre nämlich . . . eine grundsätzlich unbeschränkte
Durchgriffs-Außenhaftung gegenüber den Gläubigern . . . wie sie der Senat im
Übrigen weiterhin für die Fälle der Vermögensvermischung bejaht . . . .”).
128
United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Trans. Co., 142 F. 247, 255
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905). See also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475
(2003) (“The veil separating corporations and their shareholders may be pierced
in some circumstances . . . .The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, however,
is the rare exception, applied in the case of fraud or certain other exceptional
circumstances.”)
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[stay] within the limits of . . . public policy” in the absence of
“fraud, misrepresentation [or] illegality.”129
Consistently, Delawarean triers will yield to a would-be piercer
“in the interest of justice, [vis-à-vis] such matters as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or [favorable] equitable
consideration[s]”130 Nonetheless, they will presumptively block
her attempt. Indeed, “persuading” them on this front generally
boils down to “a difficult task.”131 It demands bearing a bit of a
burden.132
The Argentine and German enactments do not explicitly presume limited liability in this domain. Still, they do so implicitly
through their respective inaugural assertions: One, “[T]he shareholders limit their responsibility upon paying for the subscribed
shares.”133 Two, “Creditors may only hold organizational assets
accountable for the organization’s commitments.”134
Pertinently, the ordinarily highest organ of adjudication in
Germany has worried about overextending a “fundamentally unrestricted external accountability.”135 It has warned that doing so
“would risk missing the mark and, against the legislative intent,
pulling the rug out from under the [juridical] formation.”136 Therefore, the quoted decision (Trihotel) addresses an “impairment of
the enterprise’s income”—namely, a misappropriation—as a faultbased tort in order to “attenuate the consequences” and “avoid
129
130

Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955).
Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.

1968).
131

Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms. Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 114, No.
Civ. A. 1131, at 10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989).
132
Id.
133
L. 19550 art. 163 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los socios limitan su responsabilidad a
la integración de las acciones suscriptas.”).
134
AktG § 1(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Für die Verbindlichkeiten der Gesellschaft
haftet den Gläubigern nur das Gesellschaftsvermögen.”).
135
BGH, July 16, 2007, Trihotel, II ZR 3/04, ¶ 21 (“Versagen die[]
Grundregeln des Kapitalschutzes . . . , so kommt erst dann eine
durchgriffsrechtlich strukturierte, grundsätzlich unbeschränkte Außenhaftung
wegen Verlustes des Haftungsprivilegs . . . zum Zuge.”).
136
Id. ¶ 27 (“[E]ine derartige uneingeschränkte Erfolgshaftung . . . liefe
[Gefahr], in einer Vielzahl von Fällen weit über das Ziel hinauszuschießen und
der Gesellschaftsform der GmbH - entgegen den Zielen des Gesetzgebers - den
Boden zu entziehen.”).
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overreactions.”137 It posits the possibility of evidencing that “a
proper deportment” by the defendant would have produced “a
slighter harm” and charging her merely with the restitution of the
difference.138
The approach in Argentina itself diverge from its U.S. counterpart in further respects. Concretely, it treats inconsistency with the
declared institutional objective as a ground for ignoring the organizational form. Surely, this divergence derives to a significant extent from the fact that such declaration plays a prominent role on
Argentine soil, as opposed to the United States. On the former,
founders must define a “precise and definite” corporative goal.139
In the latter, they must no longer definitively deliver a definition of
the sort.140 Articulating the aim “to engage in any lawful act or
activity for which corporations may be organized” suffices.141 Delaware started accepting such an ample articulation in 1967.142
Thus, it set a trend that has spread across the nation.143
On this ultimate point, the German system resembles that of
Argentina. It commands “the bylaws [to] determine . . . the enter-

137

Id.
¶ 21
(“[D]ie
eingriffsbedingte
Schädigung
des
Gesellschaftsvermögens . . .
kann
aber
schließlich
in
eine
verschuldensabhängige Schadensersatzhaftung [zur Abmilderung . . . und zur
Vermeidung von Überreaktionen] einmünden . . . .”).
138
Id. (“[D]em Gesellschafter [wird] die Möglichkeit eröffnet . . . , den
Nachweis zu führen, dass bei ordnungsgemäßem Vorgehen ein geringerer
Schaden entstanden wäre, der dann nur in diesem Umfang auszugleichen ist.”).
139
L. 19550 art. 11(3) (Arg.) (1984) (“La designación de su objeto, que debe
ser preciso y determinado . . . .”).
140
See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 (1933) (“Permission to incorporate for ‘any lawful purpose’ was not common until 1875.”). The Model
Business Corporation Act requires a purpose clause only when the corporation
decides to impose limits. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (2016) (“Every
corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”).
141
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 102(3).
142
CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 65.
143
Id. See also id. at 239 n.35 (“A large majority of states permit such an
‘all-purpose’ clause, but about one-sixth still require a reasonably definite
statement of purposes although probably allowing it to be followed by a general
‘all-purpose’ provision.”).
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prise’s object.”144 “For industrial and commercial” companies, its
command continues, “the types of manufactured and traded products and goods should be more closely specified.”145
However, Germany’s scheme appears not to envisage a termination of investors’ immunity as a penalty for operating outside the
determination or specification. It barely bids “any stockholder or
member of the directorate or supervisory council to sue to invalidate” organizations that proclaim no end at all or do so invalidly.146
Presumably, the suitor may parallelly proceed against managers
and councilors for lack of prudence and conscientiousness in directing, instigating, or condoning the invalidities.
In conclusion, Argentine lawmakers have characteristically
codified the action to dismantle a corporate façade. Their German
colleagues seem to have shunned such codification. As a result,
they have inadvertently or intentionally invited the judge to do the
honors. In the face of the main divide between civil and common
law, Argentina and the U.S. jurisdictions have aligned as expected.
Germany has not.
GOVERNANCE
The Argentine regime exhibits its civil-law face most conspicuously in the hierarchical structure it prescribes for companies. It
contemplates, generally along German lines, not a unitary but instead a two-tier corporate governance. Publicly incorporated entities must institute a directorate and either a supervisory council or
a panel of trustees. They must avoid any overlap in membership
between the directorial and the control contingent. To boot, the

144
AktG § 23(3) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Satzung muß bestimmen . . . 2. den
Gegenstand des Unternehmens . . . .”).
145
Id. § 23(3) (“[N]amentlich ist bei Industrie- und Handelsunternehmen die
Art der Erzeugnisse und Waren, die hergestellt und gehandelt werden sollen,
näher anzugeben . . . .”).
146
Id. § 275(1) (“Enthält die Satzung keine Bestimmungen . . . über den
Gegenstand des Unternehmens oder sind die Bestimmungen der Satzung über
den Gegenstand des Unternehmens nichtig, so kann jeder Aktionär und jedes
Mitglied des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats darauf klagen, daß die
Gesellschaft für nichtig erklärt werde.”).
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latter may not sit directors, administrators or employees of the establishment.147
Article 255 of the applicable statute enunciates that the board
will run the venture. It reads, “A directorate of one or more members [inducted] by the shareholders or by the [councilors] shall
manage” the concern.148 Besides, the directorial chairperson speaks
for the enterprise with exclusivity, except when the bylaws authorize her codirectors too.149
Almost identically, Germany’s statutory framers have obliged
the directorate, composed “of one or various persons,”150 to “administer [its] organization under its own responsibility.”151 Somewhat differently, however, they have charged it, as a unit, with representing the firm “in and out of court.”152 In particular, its members, when they surpass two in number, must assume the representation collectively, “unless the bylaws declare otherwise.”153
Delaware equally entrusts the directorial board, which “shall
consist of 1 or more members,”154 with the direction of the “business and affairs of [the] corporation.”155 It seems not to posit a default rule on the representative role. Presumably the charter must
settle the matter. Other U.S. jurisdictions have held that the occu-

147

L. 19550 arts. 286, 280 (Arg.) (1984) (“No pueden ser síndicos: . . . (2)
Los directores, gerentes y empleados de la misma sociedad o de otra controlada
o controlante . . . .”) (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia
. . . .Se aplicará[] [el] artículo[] 286 . . . .”).
148
Id. art. 255 (“La administración está a cargo de un directorio compuesto
de uno o más directores designados por la asamblea de accionistas o el consejo
de vigilancia, en su caso.”).
149
Id. art. 268 (“La representación de la sociedad corresponde al presidente
del directorio.”).
150
AktG § 76(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Vorstand kann aus einer oder mehreren
Personen bestehen.”).
151
Id. § 76(1) (“Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die
Gesellschaft zu leiten.”).
152
Id. § 78(1) (“Der Vorstand vertritt die Gesellschaft gerichtlich und
außergerichtlich.”).
153
Id. § 78(2) (“Besteht der Vorstand aus mehreren Personen, so sind, wenn
die Satzung nichts anderes bestimmt, sämtliche Vorstandsmitglieder nur
gemeinschaftlich zur Vertretung der Gesellschaft befugt.”).
154
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 141(b).
155
Id. § 141(a).
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pier of the directorial presidency may “act in behalf of” the undertaking only with “authorization” from her fellows.156
The constituency of holders of stock in Argentina may instate
“between three and fifteen members” into a supervisory council.157
It may reelect them, or remove them at will.158 A candidate for office must herself own shares in the enterprise.159 She thus differs
evidently from her German counterparts as well as definitely from
Delawarean directors, who “need not be stockholders.”160
Argentine councilors mainly “supervise the directorate’s performance” and may appoint its membership.161 They “may examine the organizational accounting, goods, and bookkeeping whether directly or through” external expertise.162 Beyond reporting at
least “every trimester,”163 the oversight organ must arrange for an
“annual audit” and “submit” the results to the investors.164 It may
“convene” the latter and form a committee to explore “any issue”
raised by them or by itself.165
Germany’s version of this institution might have influenced its
equivalent in Argentina given its similarities: It must feature a trio

156

Lloydona Peters Enters. v. Dorius, 658 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1983).
See L. 19550 art. 280 (Arg.) (1984) (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia, integrado por tres a quince accionistas designados por la
asamblea . . . .”).
158
Id. (“El . . . consejo de vigilancia [estará] integrado por . . . accionistas
designados por la asamblea . . . , reelegibles y libremente revocables.”).
159
Id. (“El . . . consejo de vigilancia [estará] integrado por accionistas
. . . .”).
160
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 141(b).
161
L. 19550 arts. 281(a), 281(d) (Arg.) (1984) (“Son funciones del consejo
de vigilancia: (a) Fiscalizar la gestión del directorio . . . .(d) La elección de los
integrantes del directorio, cuando lo establezca el estatuto, sin perjuicio de su
revocabilidad por la asamblea.”).
162
Id. art. 281(a) (“Puede examinar la contabilidad social, los bienes sociales, realizar arqueos de caja, sea directamente o por peritos que designe . . . .”).
163
Id. art. 281(a) (“Por lo menos trimestralmente, el directorio presentará al
consejo informe escrito acerca de la gestión social . . . .”).
164
Id. art. 283 (“[Habrá] auditoría anual, contratada por el consejo de vigilancia, y su informe sobre estados contables se someterá a la asamblea . . . .”).
165
Id. art. 281(b), 281(f) (“(b) Convocará la asamblea cuando estime conveniente o lo requieran accionistas.”) (“(f) Designar una o más comisiones para
investigar o examinar cuestiones o denuncias de accionistas o para vigilar la
ejecución de sus decisiones.”).
157
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of members as a minimum.166 Its duties boil down to the supervision of “management.”167 They extend to hiring an “auditor” annually and convening “a shareholder meeting” whenever “the organization’s well-being so demands.”168
Likewise, the council may “review and proof the [corporation’s] books, writings, and assets” as well as recruit individuals
within it ranks “or special experts for specific tasks.”169 It may “at
any time” requisition from the directors “a report on” the entity’s
doings.170 Its “members” may not belong to the directorate.171 Nor
may they, as a group, undertake “managerial activities.”172
Nonetheless, the German model differentiates itself fundamentally by necessitating corporate councilors. It compels the appointment of half or a third of them by the workforce when the
latter comprises, respectively, (1) at least two thousand or (2) be-

166
AktG § 95 (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat besteht aus drei Mitgliedern.
Die Satzung kann eine bestimmte höhere Zahl festsetzen.”).
167
Id. § 111(1) (“Der Aufsichtsrat hat die Geschäftsführung zu überwachen.”).
168
Id. § 111(2) (“Er erteilt dem Abschlußprüfer den Prüfungsauftrag . . . .”);
id. § 111(3) (“Der Aufsichtsrat hat eine Hauptversammlung einzuberufen, wenn
das Wohl der Gesellschaft es fordert.”).
169
Id. § 111(2) (“Der Aufsichtsrat kann die Bücher und Schriften der
Gesellschaft sowie die Vermögensgegenstände . . . einsehen und prüfen.”); id.
(“Er kann damit auch einzelne Mitglieder oder für bestimmte Aufgaben
besondere Sachverständige beauftragen.”).
170
Id. § 90 (3) (“Der Aufsichtsrat kann vom Vorstand jederzeit einen Bericht
verlangen über Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaft . . . .”).
171
Id. § 105(1) (“Ein Aufsichtsratsmitglied kann nicht zugleich
Vorstandsmitglied . . . sein.”).
172
Id. § 111(4) (“Maßnahmen der Geschäftsführung können dem
Aufsichtsrat nicht übertragen werden.”).
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tween five hundred and two thousand employees.173 The selection
of the rest of the membership falls upon investors.174
In fact, France’s council resembles its Argentine namesake
precisely in its non-obligatory character.175 As in the couple of
conciliar systems surveyed so far, it “permanently” controls “the
management of the organization” by the directorial board and may
not overlap with the latter in its “members.”176 As in Germany rather than Argentina, French councilors must name the directors.177
Still, they may count solely “up to four” labor delegates, if any,
among themselves and no more than “a third” of the total.178

173

Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Law] § 1(1) (Ger.)
(1976) (“In Unternehmen, die . . . in der Rechtsform einer Aktiengesellschaft . . .
und . . . in der Regel mehr als 2.000 Arbeitnehmer beschäftigen, haben die
Arbeitnehmer ein Mitbestimmungsrecht nach Maßgabe dieses Gesetzes.”);
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [DrittelbG] [One-Third Participation Law] § 1(1)
(Ger.) (1976) (“Die Arbeitnehmer haben ein Mitbestimmungsrecht im
Aufsichtsrat nach Maßgabe dieses Gesetzes in . . . einer Aktiengesellschaft mit
in der Regel mehr als 500 Arbeitnehmern . . . .”); id. § 4(1) (“Der Aufsichtsrat
eines in § 1 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Unternehmens muss zu einem Drittel aus
Arbeitnehmervertretern bestehen.”).
174
See AktG § 96(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Der Aufsichtsrat setzt sich zusammen
bei Gesellschaften, für die das Mitbestimmungsgesetz gilt, aus
Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern der Aktionäre und der Arbeitnehmer . . . .”) (“Der
Aufsichtsrat setzt sich zusammen . . . bei Gesellschaften, für die das
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz gilt, aus Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern der Aktionäre und
der Arbeitnehmer . . . .”).
175
See CD. COM. Legislative Part, bk. II, tit. II, ch. V, § 2, Subsection 2 art.
L225-57 (Fr.) (“Du directoire et du conseil de surveillance”), (“Il peut être stipulé par les statuts de toute société anonyme que celle-ci est régie par les dispositions de la présente sous-section.”).
176
Id. art. L225-68, Subsection 2 (“Le conseil de surveillance exerce le contrôle permanent de la gestion de la société par le directoire.”); id. art. L225-74
(“Aucun membre du conseil de surveillance ne peut faire partie du directoire.”).
177
Id. art. L225-59 (“Les membres du directoire sont nommés par le conseil
de surveillance . . . .”); AktG § 96(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Vorstandsmitglieder
bestellt der Aufsichtsrat . . . .”).
178
CD. COM. art. L225-79 (Fr.) (“Il peut être stipulé dans les statuts que le
conseil de surveillance comprend . . . des membres élus . . . par le personnel de
la société . . . .”) (“Le nombre des membres du conseil de surveillance élus par
les salariés ne peut être supérieur à quatre ni excéder le tiers du nombre des
autres membres.”).
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Argentine investors may dispense with such supervision in favor of “private monitoring,”179 in one of a trinity of forms. Roughly, if nonpublic and small (worth under ten million pesos), a corporation may have its stockholders serve as monitors empowered to
inspect its “[files] and papers and entreat managers for reports.”180
If organized non-publicly and at a large scale (with over ten million pesos in capital), it may engage “one or more trustees” and an
“equal number” of substitutes to monitor.181
Thirdly, public companies may assign the trusteeing to a collegial panel of an unevenly numbered membership.182 They may
have their “administration” watchdogged in this manner.183
Whether institutional as in this case or individual as in the previous
one, the watchdog must peruse “the organizational records and
documentation . . . at least every three months”184 and prepare “a
written and well-founded account of the economic and financial
situation of the organization for each ordinary shareholderassembly.”185
This “overseeing commission”186 must “deliver” relevant “information” requested—as well as “investigate grievances formulated in writing”—by anyone possessing no less than two per cen179

L. 19550 ch. II, § V(8) (“DE LA FISCALIZACIÓN PRIVADA”) (Arg.)
(1984).
180
Id. arts. 55, 284 (“Los socios pueden examinar los libros y papeles sociales y recabar del administrador los informes que estimen pertinentes.”) (“Las
sociedades que no estén comprendidas en ninguno de los supuestos a que se
refiere el artículo 299 . . . podrán prescindir de la sindicatura cuando así esté
previsto en el estatuto. En tal caso los socios poseen el derecho de contralor que
confiere el artículo 55.”).
181
Id. art. 284 (“Está a cargo de uno o más síndicos designados por la asamblea de accionistas. Se elegirá igual número de síndicos suplentes.”).
182
Id. art. 284 (“Cuando la sociedad estuviere comprendida en el artículo
299 —excepto su inciso (2.)— la sindicatura debe ser colegiada en número impar.”).
183
Id. art. 294(1) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (1) Fiscalizar
la administración de la sociedad . . . .”).
184
Id. art. 294(1) (“[E]l síndico . . . : (1) . . . examinará los libros y documentación . . . , por lo menos, una vez cada tres (3) meses.”).
185
Id. art. 294(5) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (5) . . . Presentar a la asamblea ordinaria un informe escrito y fundado sobre la situación
económica y financiera de la sociedad . . . .”).
186
Id. art. 290 (“Cuando la sindicatura fuere plural, actuará como cuerpo
colegiado, y se denominará ‘Comisión Fiscalizadora.’”).
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tum of the stock.187 It must ensure the concern’s “compliance with
laws, bylaws, regulations, and investor resolutions.”188 The commissioners must “attend, with voice but no vote, meetings of the
directorate, executive committee, and stockholders.”189 They may
“convoke” the latter to meet extraordinarily, ordinarily, or specially.190
Shareholders may oust the appointees without cause, except
when “five percent” of the ownership objects.191 They enjoy barely
one ballot per share for the designation or dismissal of trustees.192
The voters may also determine “the remuneration” and any particular “responsibilities” of the members of not merely the trustee
panel but additionally the board and “the supervisory council.”193
Seemingly, councilors conduct themselves less intrusively than
trustees. On first impression, they appear not to show up at the
main corporate gatherings or to report on or scrutinize the corporation as frequently. Appearances notwithstanding, their collective
187

Id. arts. 294(6), 294(11) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (6)
Suministrar a accionistas que representen no menos del Dos por Ciento (2 %)
del capital, en cualquier momento que éstos se lo requieran, información sobre
las materias que son de su competencia; . . . (11) Investigar las denuncias que le
formulen por escrito accionistas que representen no menos del Dos por Ciento (2
%) del capital . . . .”).
188
Id. art. 294(9) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (9) Vigilar
que los órganos sociales den debido cumplimiento a la ley, estatuto, reglamento
y decisiones asamblearias . . . .”).
189
Id. art. 294(3) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (3) Asistir
con voz, pero sin voto, a las reuniones del directorio, del comité ejecutivo y de
la asamblea . . . .”). See also id. art. 240 (“Los . . . síndicos . . . tienen derecho y
obligación de asistir con voz a todas las asambleas. Sólo tendrán voto en la medida que les corresponda como accionistas . . . .”).
190
Id. art. 294(7) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (7) Convocar
a asamblea extraordinaria, cuando lo juzgue necesario y a asamblea ordinaria o
asambleas especiales, cuando omitiere hacerlo el directorio . . . .”)
191
Id. art. 287 (“Su designación es revocable solamente por la asamblea de
accionistas, que podrá disponerla sin causa siempre que no medie oposición del
cinco por ciento (5 %) del capital social.”).
192
Id. art. 284 (“Cada acción dará en todos los casos derechos a un sólo voto
para la elección y remoción de los síndicos . . . .”).
193
Id. arts. 234(2), 234(3) (“Corresponde a la asamblea ordinaria considerar
y resolver los siguientes asuntos: . . . (2) Designación y remoción de directores y
síndicos y miembros del consejo de vigilancia y fijación de su retribución; (3)
Responsabilidad de los directores y síndicos y miembros del consejo de vigilancia . . . .”).
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should not distinguish itself on this whole front from that of overseers. After all, it must exercise, “the functions and faculties [statutorily] attributed” to the latter, in addition to its own.194
Argentina apparently shifts to a common-law mode on all these
questions. It invites an incorporator to a range of alternatives. She
may choose according to her preferences or particularities. For instance, her choice for the supervisory council might itself derive
from her desire to allow for (1) the removal of corporate controllers against the objections of a five percent faction or (2) the conciliar determination of directorial board.195 Needless to say, it
would have to abide by the countless conditions imposed, in an
apparent shift back to a civil-law approach, on its execution.
In any event, investors designate and discharge their “directors,
trustees, and councilors” during their regular meetings.196 They
must do so “by absolute majority of the ballots present.”197 Upon
their request, the entity must adopt cumulative voting for up to a
third of the directorate, supervisory-council, or trustee-panel.198 It
may thereby grant minority stockholders a voice on any such body
through a concentration of “their votes on a limited number of
nominees.”199
194

Id. art. 281(g) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (g) Las demás funciones y facultades atribuidas en esta ley a los síndicos.”).
195
Id. art. 281(d) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (d) La elección de los integrantes del directorio, cuando lo establezca el estatuto, sin perjuicio de su revocabilidad por la asamblea.”).
196
Id. arts. 234(2) (“Corresponde a la asamblea ordinaria considerar y resolver los siguientes asuntos: . . . (2) Designación y remoción de directores y síndicos y miembros del consejo de vigilancia y fijación de su retribución . . . .”).
197
Id. arts. 243 (“Las resoluciones [de la asamblea ordinaria] serán tomadas
por mayoría absoluta de los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la respectiva
decisión, salvo cuando el estatuto exija mayor número.”).
198
Id. art. 263 (“Los accionistas tienen derecho a elegir hasta Un Tercio
(1/3) de las vacantes a llenar en el directorio por el sistema de voto acumulativo.”); id. art. 280 (“El estatuto podrá organizar un consejo de vigilancia, integrado por tres a quince accionistas designados por la asamblea conforme a los
artículos 262 o 263, reelegibles y libremente revocables.”); id. art. 289 (“Los
accionistas pueden ejercer el derecho reconocido por el artículo 263, en las condiciones fijadas por éste, [en la elección de los síndicos].”).
199
See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 587 (“Cumulative voting is a system of voting for the election of directors that is intended to give
minority shareholders representation on the board by allowing them to concentrate their votes on a limited number of nominees.”).
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Vis-à-vis a hypothetical twelve-member board, shareholders
could cumulatively install a maximum of four members. They
would receive a quartet of ballots per share if they all partook in
the cumulation.200 In this scenario, a voter holding three of twelve
shares could guarantee the installation of one of her candidates by
concentrating minimally ten of her sixteen votes behind him. In a
straight contest, she would not get a single representative if no one
else backed her. A majority owner could handpick the totality of
the directors.201
The German enactment does not envision shareholders cumulating their suffrages. In contrast, Delaware does offer the option:
The certificate of incorporation of any corporation
may provide that at [directorial] elections, each
holder of stock . . . shall be entitled to as many
votes as . . . [his] shares . . . multiplied by the number of directors to be elected . . . . [He] may cast all
[his ballots] for a single [candidacy] or may distribute them among [the various at stake].202
The Argentine scheme deviates from the Delawarean largely
inconsequentially, as in permitting some investors to participate
while others do not.203 Nevertheless, it diverges importantly in that
it announces the following about cumulative balloting: “The bylaws cannot repeal this right, nor regulate it in a way that hinders
its exercise . . . .”204
U.S. statutes mostly make such cumulation “optional.”205 A
few of them mandate it, “unless the certificate . . . expressly can-

200

L. 19550 art. 263(4) (Arg.) (1984) (“Cada accionista que vote acumulativamente tendrá un número de votos igual al que resulte de multiplicar los que
normalmente le hubieren correspondido por el número de directores a elegir.”).
201
See generally id. art. 263.
202
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 214.
203
See L. 19550 art. 263(5) (Arg.) (1984) (“Los accionistas que voten por el
sistema ordinario o plural y los que voten acumulativamente competirán en la
elección del tercio de las vacantes a llenar . . . .”).
204
See id. art. 263(4) (“El estatuto no puede derogar este derecho, ni reglamentarlo de manera que dificulte su ejercicio . . . .”).
205
CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 5, at 588.
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cels it.”206 To prevent its negation, they often “require a minimum
number of directors in each class.”207
By and large, Argentina has lined up with Germany and France
in establishing a dually headed corporate government. Hence, it
has countenanced, though to a lesser extent than this dyad of European countries, additional checks on the board along with representation of stakeholders, like creditors or workers. Perhaps under
U.S. influence, Argentine authorities have opened the door to voting cumulatively for all leadership positions. Even so, they have
ostensibly imparted to it a civil-law flavor by rendering it compulsory.
DISCIPLINE
In Argentina, “administrators” or “representatives” of any
commercial concern must “act loyally and as diligently as a good
businessperson. If they neglect their obligations, they [must] bear
unlimited and joint liability for any [injury] or prejudice that may
result from their acts or omissions.”208
Hence, the inducted managerial leadership fiducially obligates
itself toward its shareholders and corporation. It may not favor itself or anyone else over them. On this front, the leaders must meet
a high benchmark. They must deport themselves as an experienced
rather than a regular undertaker.
“[T]he organization, its investors, and [even] third parties” may
hold the directorate accountable for performing its functions poorly.209 They may sue “for violations of the law, the bylaws, or any
[corporative] regulation as well as for any other [harm] stemming

206

Id.
Id. at 600.
208
L. 19550 art. 59 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los administradores y los representantes
de la sociedad deben obrar con lealtad y con la diligencia de un buen hombre de
negocios. Los que faltaren a sus obligaciones son responsables, ilimitada y solidariamente, por los daños y perjuicios que resultaren de su acción u omisión.”).
209
Id. art. 274 (“Los directores responden ilimitada y solidariamente hacia la
sociedad, los accionistas y los terceros, por el mal desempeño de su cargo
. . . .”).
207
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from fraud, abuse of power, or grave fault.”210 Nonetheless, a director responds on the basis of her individual participation.211 She
may exempt herself from accountability if she objects to the directorial dereliction beforehand in writing and alerts the trustees,212 or
presumably the councilors.
As a token of their loyalty, “directors” must “divulge to the directorate” and the overseeing commission, or the conciliar organ,
“any contrary interest, while abstaining from participating in every
interconnected deliberation.”213 Moreover, they may not compete
with their company directly or indirectly unless they obtain stockholder authorization in advance.214 Finally, a director may contract
with the corporation if she does so as part of her professional activity and at the market rate. Otherwise she must procure the blessing
“of the directorate” or “trustee panel” (or the council) and notify
the shareholders.215
The investors may exonerate the directorial board by endorsing
its engagement, refusing to challenge it in court, or settling with

210

Id. art. 274 (“Los directores responden . . . por la violación de la ley, el
estatuto o el reglamento y por cualquier otro daño producido por dolo, abuso de
facultades o culpa grave.”).
211
Id. art. 274 (“[L]a imputación de responsabilidad se hará atendiendo a la
actuación individual cuando se hubieren asignado funciones en forma personal
de acuerdo con lo establecido en el estatuto, el reglamento o decisión asamblearia.”).
212
Id. art. 274 (“Queda exento de responsabilidad el director que participó
en la deliberación o resolución o que la conoció, si deja constancia escrita de su
protesta y diera noticia al síndico antes que su responsabilidad se denuncie al
directorio, al síndico, a la asamblea, a la autoridad competente, o se ejerza la
acción judicial.”).
213
Id. art. 272 (“Cuando el director tuviere un interés contrario al de la sociedad, deberá hacerlo saber al directorio y a los síndicos y abstenerse de intervenir en la deliberación . . . .”).
214
Id. art. 273 (“El director no puede participar por cuenta propia o de terceros, en actividades en competencia con la sociedad, salvo autorización expresa
de la asamblea . . . .”).
215
Id. art. 271 (“El director puede celebrar con la sociedad los contratos que
sean de la actividad en que éste opere y siempre que se concierten en las condiciones del mercado. Los contratos que no reúnan los requisitos del párrafo anterior sólo podrán celebrarse previa aprobación del directorio o conformidad de la
sindicatura si no existiese quórum. De estas operaciones deberá darse cuenta a la
asamblea.”).
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it.216 Nevertheless, the exoneration will founder in the face of an
encroachment upon legal precepts, the bylaws, or organizational
norms.217 So will it in case of bankruptcy or if the proprietors of at
least five percent of the totality of shares object.218 Any such objector may derivatively process the directorate.219
Normally, “the organization” may lodge the litigation.220 It
must first secure the stockholders’ consent, though.221 The consenting resolution leads automatically to the removal and replacement
of the implicated directors.222
If the corporation fails to move forward within three months,
any shareholder may do so in its stead.223 Correlatively, she may
proceed against the board’s failure.224 Probably, the two proceedings may unfold together, as in a common-law derivative action,225
or separately.

216

Id. art. 275 (“La responsabilidad de los directores y gerentes respecto de
la sociedad, se extingue por aprobación de su gestión o por renuncia expresa o
transacción, resuelta por la asamblea . . . .”).
217
Id. art. 275 (No se extinguirá la “responsabilidad . . . por violación de la
ley, del estatuto o reglamento.”).
218
Id. art. 275 (No se extinguirá la “responsabilidad . . . si . . . media oposición del cinco por ciento (5 %) del capital social, por lo menos. La extinción es
ineficaz en caso de liquidación coactiva o concursal.”).
219
Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad contra los directores . . .
podrá ser ejercida por los accionistas que hubieren efectuado la oposición prevista en el artículo 275.”).
220
Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad contra los directores
corresponde a la sociedad . . . .”).
221
Id. art. 276 (“La acción social de responsabilidad [requiere una] resolución de la asamblea de accionistas.”).
222
Id. art. 276 (“La resolución producirá la remoción del director o directores afectados y obligará a su reemplazo.”).
223
Id. art. 277 (“Si la acción . . . no fuera iniciada dentro del plazo de tres (3)
meses, contados desde la fecha del acuerdo, cualquier accionista puede promoverla . . . .”).
224
Id. art. 277 (“[C]ualquier accionista puede promover[] [la acción], sin
perjuicio de la responsabilidad que resulte del incumplimiento de la medida
ordenada.”).
225
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-40 (1986 (“Historically,
the derivative suit was conceived of as a double suit, or two suits in one: The
plaintiff (1) brought a suit in equity against the corporation seeking an order
compelling it (2) to bring a suit for damages or other relief against some third
person who had caused legal injury to the corporation.”).
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German “members of the directorate must [likewise] display
the caution of an orderly and conscientious . . . manager in their
management.”226 Upon a contravention of their commitments, they
will answer “jointly and severally” for any “ensuing” detriment.227
The main burden of proof will rest on them.228
Directors may not themselves practice a trade or work “in the
organizational branch of business.”229 They need conciliar consent
to “direct another trading [firm or to] belong to it as a personally
liable investor or to its board.”230 In the event of an infringement
upon these constraints, the concern “may demand indemnification.”231
Upon a plurality vote by the stockholders, the enterprise may
stake its “compensation claims” against promoters or members of
the directorate or the council.232 Shareholders owning one per centum or one-hundred-thousand euros worth of the stock may do the
honors instead. As a precondition, they must “show that they requested the [entity] to institute the complaint within a reasonable
time period.”233 Their pleading must additionally adduce “facts
226

AktG § 93(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Vorstandsmitglieder haben bei ihrer
Geschäftsführung die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften
Geschäftsleiters anzuwenden.”).
227
Id. § 93(2) (“Vorstandsmitglieder, die ihre Pflichten verletzen, sind der
Gesellschaft zum Ersatz des daraus entstehenden Schadens als Gesamtschuldner
verpflichtet.”).
228
Id. (“Ist streitig, ob sie die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften
Geschäftsleiters angewandt haben, so trifft sie die Beweislast.”).
229
Id. § 88(1) (“Die Vorstandsmitglieder dürfen ohne Einwilligung des
Aufsichtsrats . . . im Geschäftszweig der Gesellschaft . . .Geschäfte machen.”).
230
Id. (“Sie dürfen ohne Einwilligung auch nicht Mitglied des Vorstands
oder Geschäftsführer oder persönlich haftender Gesellschafter einer anderen
Handelsgesellschaft sein.”).
231
Id. § 88(2) (“Verstößt ein Vorstandsmitglied gegen dieses Verbot, so
kann die Gesellschaft Schadenersatz fordern.”).
232
Id. § 147(1) (“Die Ersatzansprüche der Gesellschaft aus der Gründung
gegen die nach den §§ 46 bis 48, 53 verpflichteten Personen oder aus der
Geschäftsführung gegen die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats
oder aus § 117 müssen geltend gemacht werden, wenn es die
Hauptversammlung mit einfacher Stimmenmehrheit beschließt.”).
233
Id. § 148(1)(2) (“Das Gericht lässt die Klage zu, wenn . . . (2) die
Aktionäre nachweisen, dass sie die Gesellschaft unter Setzung einer
angemessenen Frist vergeblich aufgefordert haben, selbst Klage zu erheben
. . . .”).
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that support the suspicion that the [undertaking] suffered damage
through dishonesty or a [crass] violation of a statute or the bylaws.”234
The company may itself litigate “anytime” and thereupon render any “pending” derivatively prosecuted lawsuits “inadmissible.”235 Alternatively, it may take them over.236 In either scenario,
the original filers may remain aboard,237 perchance as intervenors.
U.S. jurisdictions appear to specify directorial responsibilities
judicially rather than legislatively. Somewhat modestly, the New
Jersey’s supreme jurisdictional forum has required board members
“to discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in like positions.”238 The Delawarean
justices have embraced “the concept of gross negligence as . . . the
proper standard.”239 They have defined disloyalty as “preferring
the adverse [interest] of the fiduciary or of a related person to [that]
of the corporation.”240
The Model Business Law Act compels a “conflicted director”
to disclose her conflict to her fellows.241 They must deliberate on
their own and authorize “the transaction.”242 A “majority” of
“qualified” investors may also approve after an analogous “disclosure.”243 Beyond this duo of options,244 Delaware statutorily offers
234

Id. § 148(1)(3) (“Das Gericht lässt die Klage zu, wenn . . . (3) Tatsachen
vorliegen, die den Verdacht rechtfertigen, dass der Gesellschaft durch
Unredlichkeit oder grobe Verletzung des Gesetzes oder der Satzung ein Schaden
entstanden ist . . . .”).
235
Id. § 148(3) (“Die Gesellschaft ist jederzeit berechtigt, ihren
Ersatzanspruch selbst gerichtlich geltend zu machen; mit Klageerhebung durch
die Gesellschaft wird ein anhängiges Zulassungs- oder Klageverfahren von
Aktionären über diesen Ersatzanspruch unzulässig.”).
236
Id. (“Die Gesellschaft ist nach ihrer Wahl berechtigt, ein anhängiges
Klageverfahren über ihren Ersatzanspruch in der Lage zu übernehmen . . . .”).
237
Id. (“Die bisherigen Antragsteller oder Kläger sind in den Fällen der
Sätze 1 und 2 beizuladen.”).
238
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981).
239
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
240
Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
241
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.62(a) (2016).
242
Id.
243
Id. § 8.63(a).
244
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 144(a)(1-2).
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the possibility of establishing fairness to the enterprise and evidencing approval, not necessarily under the described conditions,
“by the board . . . , a committee” or the stockholders.245
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, in turn, presupposes that
in the ordinary course, concerns should “properly assert” their own
claims.246 It exceptionally empowers a shareholder to press the
latter, including those against board members.247 When so doing,
she must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of . . . similarly situated” investors.248 The plaintiff must “state with particularity any effort” to urge the entity toward the courthouse or “the
reasons for not” exerting herself to that end.249
The adjudicator must sign off on any settlement, voluntarily
dismissal, or compromise.250 Besides, the Delawarean top tribunal
has declared that: “After an objective and thorough investigation of
[any such] derivative suit, an independent [corporate] committee
may . . . file a pretrial motion to dismiss . . . .”251 The trier must
“give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in
addition to the [enterprise’s] best interests.”252
Expectedly, Argentina and Germany seem to set a stricter prudence-yardstick than the various U.S. states. Thereby, they come
across as slightly less friendly to directorates. The Argentine enactment delves into the procedural particulars. Its German equivalent does not, while appearing to outdo the regimes enacted
throughout the United States in hindering complainants. Accordingly, the latter must prove a directorial defendant dishonest or
grossly in breach of internal or statutory strictures. Furthermore,
the organization may readily wrest the cause from the stockholding
suitors. These hindrances might reflect serious skepticism in Germany vis-à-vis collective claimants.

245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Id. § 144(a)(3).
See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23.1(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. 23.1(b)(3).
Id. 23.1(c).
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 789.
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SHAREHOLDERS
(0) Ultimately, shareholders stand as owners of the venture.
Still, they must exercise their ownership through or against the
directorial mediation. This portion of the discussion will explore a
quintet of their essential entitlements.
(1) An Argentine investor—like the “directorate,” supervisory
councilors, or trustees—may convene her fellows to meet, whether
ordinarily or extraordinarily. Yet, to do so, her investment must
minimally add up to five percent of the total.253 The shareholding
group decides by a majority of all voters or shares, respectively, (a)
whatever it may regularly resolve (unless the bylaws mandate a
larger margin)254 or (b) any “transformation,” “dissolution,” “shift
to a foreign domicile,” or basic change of the corporate object. It
may ratify a “merger” or “breakup” by a plurality of the enfranchised stock.255 Anyone who disagrees with the determination to
undertake such transcendental transactions, excepting that of dissolving, merging, or breaking up the corporation, may return her
holdings for a full “reimbursement.”256
253

L. 19550 arts. 236, 281(b), 294(7) (Arg.) (1984) (“Las asambleas ordinarias y extraordinarias serán convocadas por el directorio o el síndico en los casos
previstos por la ley, o cuando cualquiera de ellos lo juzgue necesario o cuando
sean requeridas por accionistas que representan por lo menos el cinco por ciento
(5 %) del capital social . . . .”) (“Son funciones del consejo de vigilancia: . . . (b)
Convocará la asamblea cuando estime conveniente o lo requieran accionistas
. . . .”) (“Son atribuciones y deberes del síndico . . . : (7) Convocar a asamblea
extraordinaria, cuando lo juzgue necesario y a asamblea ordinaria o asambleas
especiales, cuando omitiere hacerlo el directorio . . . .”).
254
Id. arts. 243, 244 (“Las resoluciones [de la asamblea ordinaria] serán
tomadas por mayoría absoluta de los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la
respectiva decisión, salvo cuando el estatuto exija mayor número.”) (“Las resoluciones [de la asamblea extraordinaria] serán tomadas por mayoría absoluta de
los votos presentes que puedan emitirse en la respectiva decisión, salvo cuando
el estatuto exija mayor número.”).
255
Id. art. 244 (“Cuando se tratare de la transformación, . . . de la disolución
anticipada de la sociedad; de la transferencia del domicilio al extranjero, del
cambio fundamental del objeto . . . , las resoluciones se adoptarán por el voto
favorable de la mayoría de acciones con derecho a voto, sin aplicarse la pluralidad de voto. Esta disposición se aplicará para decidir la fusión y la escisión
. . . .”).
256
Id. art. 245 (“Los accionistas disconformes con las modificaciones incluidas en el último párrafo del artículo anterior, salvo en el caso de disolución anticipada y en el de los accionistas de la sociedad incorporante en fusión y en la
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In Germany, the directorate convokes the stockholders.257 It
must, as the supervisory council, show up along with them.258
They may then plurally pass their own regular “resolutions,” unless
an enactment establishes otherwise or the bylaws do.259 An alteration of the latter rides by default on the endorsement of “threefourths” of the voters.260 So does a disbandment,261 as well as a
combination.262
Similarly, the Delawarean “board” determines the “place” and
“the manner” in which the shareholders gather.263 It also calls specially scheduled meetings.264 In general, investors “act” by majority.265 On the other hand, they may usually elect their directorial
delegates “by a plurality.”266
(2) Stockholders in Argentina may seemingly perform their
acts by consenting. After all, they need not assemble by publicized
convention if they unanimously support whatever they are to re-

escisión, pueden separarse de la sociedad con reembolso del valor de sus acciones.”).
257
AktG § 121(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Hauptversammlung wird durch den
Vorstand einberufen . . . .”).
258
Id. § 118(3) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats sollen
an der Hauptversammlung teilnehmen.”).
259
Id. § 133(1) (“Die Beschlüsse der Hauptversammlung bedürfen der
Mehrheit der abgegebenen Stimmen (einfache Stimmenmehrheit), soweit nicht
Gesetz oder Satzung eine größere Mehrheit oder weitere Erfordernisse
bestimmen.”).
260
Id. § 179(2) (“Der Beschluß der Hauptversammlung bedarf [bei
Satzungsänderungen] einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei Viertel des bei der
Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt.”).
261
Id. § 262(1)(2) (“Die Aktiengesellschaft wird aufgelöst durch Beschluß
der Hauptversammlung; dieser bedarf einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei
Viertel des bei der Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt; die
Satzung kann eine größere Kapitalmehrheit und weitere Erfordernisse
bestimmen . . . .”).
262
Id. § 319(2) (“Der Beschluß über die Zustimmung [zu einer
Eingliederung] bedarf einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei Viertel des bei der
Beschlußfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfaßt. Die Satzung kann eine
größere Kapitalmehrheit und weitere Erfordernisse bestimmen.”).
263
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 211(a)(1).
264
Id. § 211(d).
265
Id. § 216(2).
266
Id. § 216(3).
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solve.267 Granted, the regulatory regimen seems to presuppose a
face-to-face gathering. Sensibly interpreted, though, it would cohere with shareholders simply voicing their unanimous consensus
on paper.
Under the German legislation, “[t]he bylaws may envisage [an
investor] casting [her] vote by written or electronic communication.”268 They might conceivably acquiesce in everyone doing so.
Of course, “[t]he directors and councilors must . . . participate in
the assembly,” at least by “video- and audio-broadcast.”269 Regardless, they could all presumably broadcast in this fashion to settle
concrete issues or could even skip the pointless ritual altogether
whenever none of their constituents would be putting in an appearance anyway.
Delaware, for its part, unequivocally contemplates stockholders
playing their active role “without . . . meeting, without prior notice,” “and without” voting.270 It just necessitates “consents in writing . . . signed by the holders of outstanding stock [with no] less
than the minimum number of votes . . . necessary to authorize such
action.”271 The highest jurisdictional forum has proclaimed these
options “fundamental . . . rights guaranteed by statute.”272
(3) The Argentine paradigm preferentially invites shareholders
to buy “new shares of the same class in proportion to the stock that
[they] already own.”273 It does as much regarding “debentures

267
L. 19550 art. 237 (Arg.) (1984) (“La asamblea podrá celebrarse sin publicación de la convocatoria cuando se reúnan accionistas que representen la totalidad del capital social y las decisiones . . . se adopten por unanimidad de las acciones con derecho a voto.”).
268
AktG § 118(2) (Ger.) (1965) (“Die Satzung kann vorsehen . . . , dass
Aktionäre ihre Stimmen, auch ohne an der Versammlung teilzunehmen,
schriftlich oder im Wege elektronischer Kommunikation abgeben dürfen . . . .”).
269
Id. § 118(3) (“Die Mitglieder des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats sollen
an der Hauptversammlung teilnehmen. Die Satzung kann jedoch bestimmte
Fälle vorsehen, in denen die Teilnahme von Mitgliedern des Aufsichtsrats im
Wege der Bild- und Tonübertragung erfolgen darf.”).
270
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 228.
271
Id.
272
Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985).
273
L. 19550 art. 194 (Arg.) (1984) (“Las acciones ordinarias, sean de voto
simple o plural, otorgan a su titular el derecho preferente a la suscripción de
nuevas acciones de la misma clase en proporción a las que posea . . . .”).
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convertible into shares.”274 Accordingly, an investor with ten per
centum of a stock possesses a prerogative of first refusal with respect to an equivalent percentage of any identically classified
shares that the corporation may freshly proffer.
Consequently, corporations must honor the claim to a proportionate partaking in the business. They may limit or eliminate it
only on an individual basis, as an exception, under the compulsion
of their own well-being, and with regard to stock either “distributed in payment of pre-existing debts” or “to be paid in kind.”275
Such limitation or elimination would require the approval of a preponderance of the totality of shares during an extraordinary stockholder meeting.276
Likewise, German law welcomes shareholders, “upon [their]
request,” to purchase any fresh stock in relation to that previously
sitting in their portfolio.277 It affords them “up to two weeks” to
request their due.278 In contrast, an investor in the United States
must evidently protect her “personal interest in maintaining the
274
Id. (“Los accionistas tendrán también derecho preferente a la suscripción
de debentures convertibles en acciones.”); id. art. 334(1) (“Cuando los debentures sean convertibles en acciones: (1) Los accionistas . . . gozarán de preferencia
para su suscripción en proporción a las acciones que posean, con derecho de
acrecer . . . .”).
275
Id. art. 197 (“La asamblea extraordinaria . . . puede resolver en casos
particulares y excepcionales, cuando el interés de la sociedad lo exija, la limitación o suspensión del derecho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas acciones, bajo las condiciones siguientes: . . . 2) Que se trate de acciones a integrarse
con aportes en especie o que se den en pago de obligaciones preexistentes.”); id.
art. 194 (“Los derechos [de preferencia] no pueden ser suprimidos o condicionados, salvo lo dispuesto en el artículo 197 . . . .”).
276
Id. art. 197 (“La asamblea extraordinaria, con las mayorías del último
párrafo del artículo 244, puede resolver . . . la limitación o suspensión del derecho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas acciones . . . .”); id. art. 235(5)
(“Corresponden a la asamblea extraordinaria . . . (5) Limitación o suspensión del
derecho de preferencia en la suscripción de nuevas acciones conforme al artículo
197 . . . .”); id. art. 244 (En estos casos, “las resoluciones se adoptarán por el
voto favorable de la mayoría de acciones con derecho a voto, sin aplicarse la
pluralidad de voto.”).
277
AktG § 186(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Jedem Aktionär muß auf sein Verlangen
ein seinem Anteil an dem bisherigen Grundkapital entsprechender Teil der
neuen Aktien zugeteilt werden.”).
278
Id. (“Für die Ausübung des Bezugsrechts ist eine Frist von mindestens
zwei Wochen zu bestimmen.”).
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balance of power . . . in [a closely held corporation] by special
provisions in the corporate articles or bylaws or in [stockholder]
agreements.”279 Hence, she must contractually coerce the offer of
“any shares [on sale] to the corporation or pro rata to all . . . shareholders.”280
Nevertheless, the top tribunal in Massachusetts might have signaled an alternative take on the matter by faithfully and reciprocally obliging investors. It enunciated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc. that “stockholders in the close corporation owe one
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of
the enterprise [as] partners [do].”281 In light of this enunciation,
maybe they must preserve the ratio of each other’s investment. In
the next breath, the opinion acknowledges that elsewhere “courts
[have] fairly consistently” rejected its posture out of a disinclination “to interfere in those facets of internal corporate [dealings
that] essentially involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority control.”282
(4) A shareholder in Argentina statutorily enjoys a right of examination. She may pore over “the organization’s [accounts] and
papers and entreat managers for reports that [she deems] relevant.”283 However, investors appear to benefit from no such guaranty in companies with a supervisory council or trustees.284 Apparently, they may not access corporate archives on their own in pub-

279

See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Or. 1977).
Id.
281
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass.
1976) (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328
N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)).
282
Id. at 662.
283
L. 19550 art. 55 (Arg.) (1984) (“Los socios pueden examinar los libros y
papeles sociales y recabar del administrador los informes que estimen pertinentes.”).
284
Id. (“[No] corresponde a los socios de sociedades por acciones [el derecho de contralor], salvo el supuesto del último párrafo del artículo 284.”); id. art.
284 (“Las sociedades que no estén comprendidas en ninguno de los supuestos a
que se refiere el artículo 299 . . . , podrán prescindir de la sindicatura cuando así
esté previsto en el estatuto. En tal caso los socios poseen el derecho de contralor
que confiere el artículo 55.”).
280
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lic or large companies, which must internally instate overseers,285
or in small corporations that opt for such instatement. Problematically, a stockholder perhaps cannot acquire access to pertinent data
upon a suspicion that the bodies in charge of oversight are neglecting their function or conspiring with the administration to her detriment. At most, she could sue them.
In Germany, the directorate must deliver “information on organizational affairs to the extent imperative for the appropriate
assessment of agenda items” that shareholders plan to discuss upon
meeting.286 It must do so “in accordance with the precepts of conscientious and faithful accountability”287 but “may refuse [in a
managerially reasonable attempt to thwart] considerable disadvantage to the organization.”288 Under the Delawarean regime, an
investor may, through a document “under oath,” demand “to inspect for any proper purpose . . . [t]he corporation’s stock ledger, a
list of its stockholders, and its other books and records.”289 Specifically, she must aver an end “reasonably related to [her] interest as
a” shareholder.290 Upon a declination, she may judicially “compel
[the] inspection.”291
(5) An Argentine corporation may issue preferred shares entailing a priority claim to dividend disbursements.292 It may divest

285
Id. art. 158 (“La sindicatura o el consejo de vigilancia son obligatorios en
la sociedad cuyo capital alcance el importe fijado por el artículo 299, inciso
(2).”).
286
AktG § 131(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Jedem Aktionär ist auf Verlangen in der
Hauptversammlung vom Vorstand Auskunft über Angelegenheiten der
Gesellschaft zu geben, soweit sie zur sachgemäßen Beurteilung des Gegenstands
der Tagesordnung erforderlich ist.”).
287
Id. § 131(2) (“Die Auskunft hat den Grundsätzen einer gewissenhaften
und getreuen Rechenschaft zu entsprechen.”).
288
Id. § 131(3)(1) (“Der Vorstand darf die Auskunft verweigern, (1) soweit
die Erteilung der Auskunft nach vernünftiger kaufmännischer Beurteilung
geeignet ist, der Gesellschaft . . . einen nicht unerheblichen Nachteil zuzufügen
. . . .”).
289
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 220(b)(1).
290
Id. § 220(b).
291
Id. § 220(c)).
292
L. 19550 art. 17 (Arg.) (1984) (Heading: “Acciones preferidas: derecho
de voto”).
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them of the franchise.293 Notwithstanding, the purchaser may attend ordinary and extraordinary meetings along with everybody
else.294 Furthermore, she may vote exceptionally when her nonpreferred counterparts are deliberating to divide up, combine, or wind
down the company or to change cardinally its declared objective,
domicile it abroad, or postpone preferences on dividends.295
Various German statutory sections equally envision stock preferred on “the distribution of profits.”296 They allow its issuance
without any voting privileges and as a maximum up to “half of the
corporate capital.”297 The shares at stake attain suffrage during
nonpayment of “the preferential amount,” while approving additional ones of their sort, or upon revocation of their “preference.”298
Delaware, in turn, provides for “preferred . . . stock . . . entitled
to receive [preferential] dividends . . . as [defined] in the certificate
of incorporation or in [an enabling] resolution . . . by the board of
directors.”299 Therefore, it ostensibly accords corporations plenty
of latitude on the definition. Nonetheless, they must permit preferred investors “to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment
[that] would [adversely alter] the . . . number [or benefits] of [any]
shares [with preference.]” 300
(1-5) On all five fronts except the third (pertaining to the
preservation of proprietary proportionality), Argentina and Germa293
Id. (“Las acciones con preferencia patrimonial pueden carecer de voto,
excepto para las materias incluidas en el cuarto párrafo del artículo 244, sin
perjuicio de su derecho de asistir a las asambleas con voz.”)
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
AktG § 12(1) (Ger.) (1965) (“Vorzugsaktien können nach den
Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes als Aktien ohne Stimmrecht ausgegeben werden.);
id. § 139(1) (“Für Aktien, die mit einem Vorzug bei der Verteilung des Gewinns
ausgestattet sind, kann das Stimmrecht ausgeschlossen werden (Vorzugsaktien
ohne Stimmrecht).”).
297
Id. § 139(2) (“Vorzugsaktien ohne Stimmrecht dürfen nur bis zur Hälfte
des Grundkapitals ausgegeben werden.”).
298
Id. § 140(2) (“Ist der Vorzug nachzuzahlen und wird der Vorzugsbetrag
in einem Jahr nicht . . . gezahlt . . . , so haben die Aktionäre das Stimmrecht, bis
die Rückstände gezahlt sind.”); id. § 141(4) (“Ist der Vorzug aufgehoben, so
gewähren die Aktien das Stimmrecht.”)
299
Del. Gen. Corp. L., § 151(c).
300
Id. § 242 (b)(2).
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ny seem to treat a stockholder overall as in the United States. Simultaneously, they appear to exhibit less flexibility toward the corporation. Facially, the Delawarean codification countenances companies configuring their shareholder meetings and preferential
stock to a greater degree as they see fit. It more clearly releases
them from the onus of meeting live, pledging themselves to proportional participation, and opening their files in the absence of an
appropriate aim.
EPILOGUE
This piece has discerned the Latin American and Continental
European from the U.S. regulation of incorporated companies. It
has spotlighted how one and the other structure themselves as well
as handle incorporation, incorporators, piercing, governance, discipline, and shareholders. They both rely, certainly, on legislation
and adjudication in their regulatory exertions yet do so differently,
qualitatively in addition to quantitatively.
Apparently, civil and common law continue to specialize respectively though not exclusively in statutes and binding precedents. Still, they ever more frequently intrude into each other’s
apparent specialty, while leaving their own imprint on it. The tendency to converge coexists with that to diverge.
This general difference, in tandem with the correlative concurrence, has evolved immemorially, growing in nuances and exceptions. Absent unexpected cataclysms, it should persist down this
path into the future. So will its more specific counterparts, highlighted throughout the just wrapped-up discussion. They equally
insinuate a somewhat tentative, simplistic, distorting picture of
contrasts and similarities.
So depicted, Latin America and Continental Europe seem to
foment jurisdictional diversity, concentrate on compliance, enthrone an ever-present state, evoke the concept of the collective
good, and dedicate themselves to stakeholders. On the other hand,
the United States appears to compel convergence among competing jurisdictions, focus on flexibility or user-friendliness, kowtow
to an all-powerful corporation (or directorate), wave the flag of
individualism or efficiency, and consecrate itself to stockholders.
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Expectedly, this seeming opposition on specifics will likewise endure and modulate alongside any collateral conjunction.

